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LAW WITHOUT THE STATE: THE THEORY OF HIGH 
ENGAGEMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF SPONTANEOUS 
LEGAL ORDER WITHIN COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
Bryan Druzin  
 
This paper examines the idea that commercial law has the capacity to evolve 
spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority because of its unique 
nature.  I argue that the manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a 
crucial role in this ability as it involves a high degree of overall engagement.  
This I term “high engagement,” which I divide into two elements: repetition and 
the creation of clear cycles of interaction.  Together they produce identifiable 
legal norms and subsequent compliance.  Game theorists have long recognized 
the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation; however, how the 
manner of commercial interaction itself facilitates this process has been left 
largely unexamined.  Part I presents a brief overview of the concept of reciprocity 
and spontaneous law theory.  In Part II, a more detailed explanation of the notion 
of high engagement is offered.  Here I set out exactly how high engagement is 
instrumental in the emergence of legal norms.  Finally, the paper concludes that 
the element of high engagement indeed plays a decisive role in commercial law’s 
ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion—an 
important insight in terms of the future international development of the modern 
law merchant as it emerges in the absence of a single legislative authority. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial law
1
 is a fundamentally unique area of law.  Unique because it reacts to, and 
is a reflection of, commercial forces: a vast body of regulation that is a response to a pre-
existing and deeply entrenched human activity—commerce.2  As such, it is a mistake to 
                                                 
 PhD candidate and visiting tutor at King‘s College, London. 
1
 What is meant here is commercial law in its most basic sense: the formation of a contract between parties 
and the exchange of property—the purest form of this being trade in some sense or another.  However, 
radiating outward from this core starting point, commercial law also should be read as including the 
contracts parties themselves draw up, the rules of international arbitration, and even, in its more general 
sense, the rules of multi-sovereign bodies such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO).  In this general sense, the term is inclusive 
of the most simple, and at the same time, the most complex definitions of what is commonly meant by the 
term commercial law.  However, the discussion that follows is primarily concerned with law that is largely 
the product of choices and behavior of individual economic actors, which evolves in the absence of a 
definite authority.   
2
  As one scholar puts it: ―Society is substantially an economic social pattern stabilized by legal principles.  
Economics weaves its want into all facets of society, dragging along with it the relevant legal concepts.‖  
  2 
simply compartmentalize it as one mere subsection of law, such as family law, criminal 
law, or environmental law.  This is to fundamentally misunderstand its basic nature.
3
   
Commercial law is grounded upon an entirely different paradigm of human interaction, 
one inextricably linked to commercial principles such as exchange, competition and 
profit.
4
  As such, the manner in which parties relate to one another is wholly unique.   
 
The upshot of all this is that while law of a non-commercial nature by and large requires 
the backing of a state to give it  efficacy, a great deal of commercial law as it exists today 
has in fact evolved largely through its own energy, shaped by market forces.
5
 Indeed, the 
underpinnings of the most basic principles of contract such as formation, content, 
misrepresentation, mistake, and duress, originally arose not through the complex 
mechanics of legislation, but from the customary rules of merchants, only to be later co-
opted by nation-states and codified.
6
 The market requires law because it serves the needs 
of the market; it has always been so.  Just as a common medium of exchange aids the 
market, common norms, i.e. laws, facilitate exchange.  Private ordering reduces 
transaction costs and protects the property rights exchanged through trade.
7
  Today, the 
practices of merchants continue to drive the development of commercial law as 
                                                                                                                                                 
RONALD CHARLES WOLF, TRADE, AID AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW, at vii 
(2004). 
3
 It is telling that throughout THE MORALITY OF LAW, Fuller‘s illustrations of the coordinating effects of 
law are entirely drawn from the commercial realm: the law of quasi-contract, the law of contract, and Tort 
law.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF  LAW, ch. 1 (1969). 
4
 See, Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL 644, 644 (1989) (―Commerce is an evolving process of interaction and reciprocity which is 
simultaneously facilitated by and leads to an evolving system of commercial law.‖). 
5
 See generally id. 
6
 Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralised Law, 14 
INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216 (1994) (speaking about the absorption of merchant practices into the 
English common law, where ―judges dictated conformity to merchant practices, not the practices to which 
merchants should conform.  By this process, the law merchant was allegedly absorbed into English 
common law‖). 
7
 Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant And The Global Market Place, in THE PRACTICE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 14 (Berger ed., 2001). 
  3 
evidenced in international commercial arbitration, and indirectly articulated in documents 
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which point to the reality that business practices in fact serve 
as the primary source of substantive business law.  In our present age, the unremitting 
force of the market continues to shepherd a regulatory framework within which it can 
function.  Codification efforts such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, CISG, and the Lando-
Principles, are but formal reflections of this phenomenon.
8
  Indeed, modern international 
trade displays a strong tendency towards autonomous regulation, with individual contract 
drafting and international commercial arbitration, both of which are firmly rooted in the 
principle of party autonomy, fostering this evolution.
9
    
 
It is the central contention of this paper that commercial law stands apart from other 
forms of law in that it is uniquely equipped to evolve spontaneously.
10
  The core reason 
for this, I will argue, is that commerce implies a very specific manner of interaction, 
which, for lack of a more impressive term, I inartfully refer to here as high engagement.  
This notion of high engagement forms the subject of this discussion.  The basic question I 
will attempt to answer is: In what way is this characteristic of high engagement 
instrumental in allowing commercial law to evolve in a decentralized, spontaneous 
fashion, without the necessity to resort to a central legislative authority? The remainder of 
this paper is simply an attempt at answering this key question.  Game theorists have long 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 9 (―The new lex mercatoria is created by the parties to international commercial transactions and 
their arbitral tribunals.  Thus, the UNIDROIT and Lando-Principles are not 'Re-Statements' but 'Pre-
Statements' of the new lex mercatoria‖) (footnotes omitted). 
9
 Id. at 5. 
10
 See Benson, supra note 4.  Benson looks at the emergence the Law Merchant in medieval Europe, 
concluding that ―nation-states are not a prerequisite for law . . . the merchant community‘s ‗enterprise‘ of 
accomplishing the subjection of commercial conduct to control naturally generated mechanisms for 
recognition, adjudication, and change.‖ Id. at 646.  See also BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 
30 (1990) for a theoretical and historical discussion of this phenomenon.   
  4 
recognized the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation.
11
  However, 
the distinct manner of interaction implied by commercial dealings has been left largely 
unexamined.  How repetition induces cooperation has been well studied, and thus does 
not represent the principal focus of our discussion; rather, how commercial interaction 
induces repetition in the first place is what I will examine.   
 
Many have contributed to the idea of ―spontaneous law,‖ in its most recent incarnations, 
most notably the work of Hayek, and to some degree Fuller.
12
  Game theorists, 
libertarians, anarchists, and law and economic scholars alike all postulate that law may 
evolve and function in the absence of the state.
13
  Indeed, ―while law can be imposed 
from above by some powerful authority, like a king, a legislature, or a supreme court, law 
can also develop ‗from the ground‘, as a result of a recognition of mutual benefits.‖14  As 
Cooter phrases it, ―Rather than proceeding from the top to bottom, lawmaking can 
                                                 
11
 Indeed much of the game theory literature addresses the principle of repeated interaction in the context of 
iterated games.  See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 
(Cambridge University Press 1982); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of 
Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390 (1981); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists, 
75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306 (1981); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
12
 See FULLER, supra note 3; F.A. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER (1973); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO 
SERFDOM  3-37 (1944) (arguing against centrally planned economies). See generally R.C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (arguing that order can arise spontaneously within close-knit groups who 
repeatedly interact); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (showing how the minimalist 
state arises naturally from anarchy); CHARLES LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3-6 (1965) 
(exploring the idea of coordination without hierarchy); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-
OPERATION AND WELFARE (1986) (demonstrating how conventions of property, mutual aid, and the 
voluntary supply of public goods can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested 
individuals); MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION (1976) (arguing that there are conditions 
under which rational actors will cooperate to produce public goods); MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, 
ANARCHY AND LIBERTY (1982) (arguing that stateless social order is possible if ―relations between people 
are those characteristic of community‖). 
13
 See HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER (1973); see also Cooter, supra note 6; Benson, supra note 4, at 644; 
Bruce L. Benson, Customary Law with Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A 
Description of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion, 9 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 25 
(1990); Bruce L. Benson, Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without 
Government, 9 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1, 1-22 (1989). See generally DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF 
FREEDOM (2d ed. 1971); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND THE STATE: A TREATISE ON 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1962); Cooter, supra note 6. 
14
 Bruce L. Benson, Reciprocal Exchange as the Basis for Recognition of Law: Examples from American 
History, 10 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 53, 53 (1991). 
  5 
proceed from bottom to top.‖15  Hayek suggests that this spontaneous legal order evolves 
slowly over time just as markets do, as a by-product of participants‘ active engagement in 
it.
16
  In this sense, while most forms of law are creations of the state, commercial law is, 
in many respects, the creation of commerce itself, stateless and implicitly trans-
regional.
17
  Indeed, in an inter-regional context, the growth of commercial rules has 
advanced at a swifter speed than its non-commercial counterpart.  This is exemplified in 
the law merchant, both old and new.
18
  There are obvious reasons for this: for instance, 
commerce‘s potential to produce mutual benefit, a commonality of interests, the 
importance of inter-regional trade, and so forth.  However, the specific manner of 
interaction involved in commercial activity is key in truly understanding this 
phenomenon.   
 
It has been well recognized that the reciprocal gains from the recognition of rules of 
property and contract (and the potential loss of them) often serve as self-enforcing 
mechanisms, encouraging compliance.
19
  As such, private ordering within the realm of 
commerce may emerge without the necessity to resort to state-enforced rules.  And this in 
fact is precisely what we find when we turn and examine the modern complexion of 
much of the lex mercatoria as it exists today, where indeed a central legislative authority 
                                                 
15
 Cooter, supra note 6, at 215. 
16
 Hayek distinguishes between the ―order of actions‖ and the ―order of rules‖ and suggests that, for given 
rules, the order of actions is what emerges from the spontaneous process governed by the order of rules.  
Hayek, supra note 13.  He also argues that the order of rules can emerge spontaneously, just as the order of 
actions does.  B.L. Benson, Economic Freedom and the Evolution of Law, 18 CATO JOURNAL 209, 209 
(1998). 
17
 Trakman writes, ―The self-sufficiency of the Law Merchant therefore retains its basic ingredients today 
as it did yesterday: it remains transregional in character, commercial in orientation, and expeditious in 
intent.‖ LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 3 (1983). 
18
 See generally Benson, supra note 4.   
19
 See id. at 646 ( ―reciprocal gains from the recognition of rules of property and contract provided 
sufficient incentives for merchants to establish their own stateless enterprise of law [referring to the 
medieval Law Merchant]‖).  
  6 
is notably absent.  Custom and an aggregation of trans-national treaties have emerged as 
the principal sources of law.
20
  Despite its many deficiencies, commercial law has 
evolved frequently in the absence of a single coercive power.  This was possible partly 
because, unlike other areas of law, the element of reciprocity underlying the activity of 
commerce allowed it to do so.  The spontaneous law literature is grounded upon this 
dynamic of reciprocity.  It is central because, as B. L. Benson concludes, it is the primary 
means of inducing compliance in the absence of enforcement.
21
  In place of enforcement, 
Fuller opines, it falls upon sheer self-interest to foster a recognition and protection of 
rights.
22
  
  
While this is certainly true, the literature largely overlooks a second yet vitally important 
element—namely, the high level of general engagement that exists in commerce, and 
how it operates in supporting the element of reciprocity.  Indeed, commercial activity 
stands apart from non-commercial forms of interaction in that participants simply tend to 
be more regularly engaged in the undertaking.  This is important.  This high level of 
engagement, which is the mark of commercial trade, reinforces the effects of reciprocity 
on systems of spontaneous order, accelerating the formation of legal norms by pulling 
relevant actors into repeated and more involved contact with one another.  High 
engagement enhances the impact of reciprocity because it increases the overall rate and 
scope of interaction, and this helps forge customary norms and promote compliance.  The 
higher the level of overall engagement, the more likely it is that behavioral norms will 
                                                 
20
 Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Customary Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 603 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., Edward Elgar 2000). 
21
 Benson, supra note 16, at 211.  See also Benson, supra note 4, at 646 (―it becomes clear that reciprocal 
arrangements are the basic source of the recognition of duty to obey law (and of law enforcement when 
state coercion does not exist)‖).   
22
 See FULLER, supra note 3, at 23. 
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emerge spontaneously (and be adhered to).  Below I argue that this phenomenon of high 
engagement has two important components: the first is sheer repetition and repeated 
exposure, the second is a tendency to assign positive obligations to participants, creating 
clear cycles of interaction, inducing cooperation.
23
  As we shall see, these two aspects of 
commercial interaction (along with reciprocity) play a pivotal role in allowing 
commercial law to evolve spontaneously.   
 
Without the key ingredient of high engagement it is difficult for social-legal ordering to 
develop as a result of reciprocity alone.  To use an imperfect analogy: if reciprocity is 
understood as the serrated teeth of a saw, high engagement is like the hewing of that saw.  
With each quick pass of the blade, a deeper groove of expected behavior is cut, in due 
course producing a recognized behavioral convention—a legal norm.  Repeated cycles of 
purposive engagement stimulate the emergence of customary norms and induce 
compliance.  Thus, in this way, the manner in which the players engage in the activity is 
decisive—and commercial activity possesses a uniquely accelerated pace of purposive 
interaction.  While the underlying elements of high engagement and reciprocity 
predominate in commerce, this is simply not the case of behavior regulated by law of a 
non-commercial nature, where these features are considerably less pronounced, or 
entirely absent.   
 
The following discussion will be divided into two parts.  Part I presents a brief overview 
of the idea of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory.  In Part II, a more detailed 
explanation of the notion of engagement is offered.  Here I set out exactly how high 
                                                 
23
 The word ‗game‘ is meant here in the sense of game theory. 
  8 
engagement facilitates the development of and compliance with legal norms, mapping out 
how high engagement induces the evolution of normative systems.  A warning though 
should be made at the outset: the tone of the paper is heavily theoretical.  The reader will 
forgive me if at times this comes at the expense of a more empirical approach.  While the 
topic is deserving of a far more in-depth, intricate, and empirical discussion, the goal here 
is more modest; it is to merely set out some core observations regarding the nature of 
commercial interaction in the broadest of strokes—to provide a skeletal framework upon 
which, hopefully, further examination may be pursued.  Finally, the conclusion the paper 
reaches is that this element of high engagement plays a decisive role in commercial law‘s 
ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous manner.
24
  This is an 
important insight in terms of the future development of the modern law merchant, as it 
emerges in the absence of a central legislative authority.  Indeed, degrees of order can 
arise from anarchy.
25
 
 
II. COMMERCIAL LAW AS A SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM 
 
Legal positivists espouse a distinctly hardened view of law.  A legal positivist conception 
of law – commercial and non-commercial alike – contends that law must be enforced by 
                                                 
24
 A proviso: it is not my contention here that the growth of international commercial law is necessarily 
―fair.‖  Arguably, many aspects of commercial globalization are not.  While many of the ideas regarding 
law and property presented in this discussion may be seen as espousing a libertarian position, this is not so.  
Although I draw heavily from concepts such as spontaneous market order, the presupposition that such 
orders are implicitly fair is not assumed here as it is in Libertarianism.  In many respects the systems that 
emerge are not equitable.  Rather, the point at issue here is simply that commercial law, as opposed to law 
of a non-commercial nature, has a unique ability to evolve and function in the absence of a central 
authority.  It is this aspect of commercial law that I will explore.  Any value judgments—positive or 
negative—as to the effects of this phenomenon (because there are many) lie beyond the intended scope of 
this paper.  In the following pages, there is no critique or defense of globalization offered; the sole purpose 
here is to present an academic exploration of commercial law‘s innate ability to spontaneously evolve, and 
no more. 
25
 Anarchy is used here in its pure root sense: an absence of government.  As Ellickson declares, anarchy 
does not imply disorder; only those unable to envision order without government equate the two.  
ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 138. 
  9 
an overarching authority lest it forfeit all claim to legal validity.  In a sense, a legal 
positivist would argue: if there is no one to enforce the rules, there can be no real rules.  
This belief is eminently clear in the conclusions of early proponents of legal positivism 
such as Austin.
26
  And indeed, historically, this has been the underlying assumption of the 
vast majority of economists who have turned their sights on law.
27
  However, this is no 
more than an assumption.  It is just one competing theory.  Hayek for one issues a sharp 
rebuke of this view of law, condemning it as ―the fiction that all law is the product of 
somebody‘s will.‖28  Similarly, Fuller rejects the notion that all law must be enforceable 
by a threat of force through state power, as through a court, asserting that to adopt such a 
view would be essentially to ―define ‗law‘ by an imperfection.‖29  To do so, Fuller points, 
                                                 
26
 Austin, a vociferous advocate for the legal positivist position, argues that rules must be backed by the 
threat of enforcement.  Failing this, he contends, there can be no legal obligation: 
 
to say a person is under a legal obligation to act in a certain way becomes, for Austin, the 
claim that the person is ―obnoxious to‖ or liable to a sanction (pain) in the event of 
noncompliance with the wish of the politically sovereign power.  The obligatoriness of 
law, in other words, is an alternative description of the readiness of the sovereign to make 
its threat of a sanction effective .. . . Austin‘s conception is a stark form of legal 
voluntariness: the exercise of superior force alone accounts for the creation of legal 
duties.  
 
LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 20 (1981).  ―On 
this basis [enforcement by a sovereign], so-called ‗customary law‘ was to be excluded from the province of 
jurisprudence, unless it had been adopted as the content of a wish by some state organ.  The same was true 
of public international law and of conventional constitutional law.‖ J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 30 
(2d ed. 1997). 
27
 See Benson, supra note 4, at 644. 
28
 Hayek writes, 
  
such confusions are at the root of the basic conceptions of highly influential schools of 
thought which have wholly succumbed to the belief that all rules or laws must have been 
invented or explicitly agreed upon by somebody . . . [and] that all power of making laws 
must be arbitrary, or that there must always exist an ultimate ―sovereign‖ source of power 
from which all law derives . . . .  This is especially true of that tradition in legal theory 
which more than any other is proud of having fully escaped from anthropomorphic 
conceptions, namely legal positivism; for it proves on examination to be entirely based on 
what we have called the constructivist fallacy . . . which, in taking literally the expression 
that man has ―made‖ all his culture and institutions, has been driven to the fiction that all 
law is the product of somebody‘s will. 
 
HAYEK, supra note 13, at 28. 
29
 Fuller, supra note 26, at 221. 
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would imply that our definition of law could not then include any system of regulation 
that ―works so smoothly that there is never any occasion to resort to force or the threat of 
force to effectuate its norms.‖30  Clearly, the failure of a system cannot serve as its 
defining characteristic.   
 
Fuller states the issue quite succinctly when he asks, ―The question that gives trouble is, 
How can a person, a family, a tribe, or a nation impose law on itself that will control  its 
relations with other persons, families, tribes, or nations? Unlike morality, law cannot be a 
thing self-imposed; it must proceed from some higher authority.‖31  Fuller concludes this 
question arises from ―the notion that the concept of law involves at the very minimum 
three elements: a lawgiver and at least two subjects whose relations are put in order by 
rules imposed on them by the law-making authority.‖32  Essentially, the legal positivist 
position precludes the possibility that, having removed the law-making authority from the 
equation, law might still arise from merely the two subjects.
33
  
 
Indeed, systems of commercial regulation are perfectly capable of establishing and 
enforcing their own laws without the need to resort to state coercion.  As Ellickson 
concludes in his analysis of property rights, ―Contrary to Hobbes and Locke, a property 
system can get going without an initial conclave.‖34  Elsewhere, Ellickson notes that, ―in 
some contexts initial rights might arise from norms generated through decentralized 
                                                 
30
 Id.. 
31
 FULLER, supra note 3, at 233. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Ellickson articulates a forceful indictment of this position.  See "The Legal-Centrist Position" in 
ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 139. 
34
 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1366 (1993). 
  11 
social processes, rather than from law.‖35  Such law is ―recognized not because it is 
backed by the power of some strong individual or institution, but because each individual 
recognizes the benefits of behaving in accordance with other individuals‘ expectations, 
given that others also behave as he expects.‖36  Unlike law of a non-commercial nature, 
the underpinning feature of reciprocity, which characterizes commercial activity, and 
from which commercial law is constructed and operates, provides a set of mechanics not 
at all envisioned in the legal positivist‘s view of law.  And this dynamic, most prominent 
in commercial activity, allows commercial regulation to arise in an all-together different 
fashion.   
A. The Element of Reciprocity 
As I have mentioned, reciprocal gains from the recognition of rules of property and 
contract provide sufficient incentives for law.
37
  In a system of spontaneous legal creation 
and compliance, where there is no external coercion, this element of reciprocity is 
essential.
38
  Benson explains that ―[t]he authority which can most effectively back law is 
individual realization of reciprocal benefits arising from recognition of that law.‖39  
Attempting to define reciprocity, Taylor writes, ―reciprocity is made up of a series of acts 
each of which is short-run altruistic (benefiting others at a cost to the altruist) but which 
together typically make every participant better off.‖40  David Hume defined it nicely: 
―Hence, I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because 
I forsee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind . . . .‖41  
                                                 
35
 ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 139. 
36
 Benson, supra note 14, at 54. 
37
 Benson, supra note 4, at 644. 
38
 See Benson, supra note 14. 
39
 Benson, supra note 4, at 646. 
40
 TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 29. 
41
 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 521 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1896) 
(1739-1740). 
  12 
In the language of game theory, reciprocity can be understood as a basic tit-for-tat 
strategy.
42
  Indeed, in his famous article The Evolution of Cooperation, Axelrod defines 
the element of reciprocity precisely in these terms.
43
  Reciprocity ―involves returning like 
behavior with like.‖44  It is a coordination of action governed by a succession of action 
and response.   
 
1. The Importance of Reciprocity in the Absence of External Coercion.   
In theories of spontaneous law such as those of Fuller and Hayek, reciprocity plays a 
critical role.
45
  In systems where there is no external enforcement, ―coercion‖ must exist 
in the form of mutual self-interest.
46
  While this reciprocity need not be immediately 
realized, it underpins all systems of law where exogenous coercion is not present.  
Benson explains that, ―reciprocity has implications for the evolution of moral behavior 
because it means that an individual can face an immediate choice of bearing costs by 
recognizing another‘s property rights but perhaps without an immediate gain, in 
expectation of future reciprocal behavior by someone else.‖47  It is the force of reciprocal 
gain that renders such systems effectual, infusing the notion of legal duty with a sense of 
personal consequence.
48
  Thus, as Fuller points out ―duties generally can be traced to the 
principle of reciprocity.‖49  Indeed, Fuller argues that the legitimacy of customary law in 
                                                 
42
 See AXELROD, supra note 11, at 118-20. 
43
 ―This strategy is simply one of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player 
did on the preceding move.  Thus TIT FOR TAT is a strategy of cooperation based on reciprocity.‖ 
Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1393.   
44
 Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role Of Reciprocity In International Law, 36 CORNELL INT‘L L.J., 93, 
94 (2003). 
45
 See generally FULLER, supra note 3, ch. 1. 
46
 See Benson, supra note 16, at 211. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 FULLER, supra note 3, at 22. 
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general sprung from ―the principle of consensual reciprocity of expectations.‖50  In a 
system that requires voluntary compliance, reciprocity must be present in one form or 
another in order to induce this willingness to comply.   
 
Parisi and Ghei look at the role of reciprocity in international law in a game theoretic 
framework, concluding that reciprocity is an essential component in its functioning—an 
element that should be considered a ―meta-rule‖ in the system of international law.51 
Although they do not look specifically at commercial law, their findings apply perhaps 
even more readily to the emergence of transnational commercial law.  Here,  
the concept of reciprocity assumes peculiar importance in a world where 
there is no [clear] external authority to enforce agreements, that is in a 
world that exists in a Hobbesian state of nature . . . . Such a strategy 
permits cooperation in a state of nature, when no authority for 
enforcement of agreements exists.
52
   
 
Parisi and Ghei point out that international law in fact exists in such a state of nature, 
with no authority always possessing jurisdiction to enforce agreements.
53
 
 
Reciprocity, in this sense, is of paramount importance.  Self-interest corrals the actions of 
individuals into efficient coordination—it is in this way a basic principle of such social 
order.  The starker the manifestation of this element of reciprocity is in a given social 
arrangement, the easier cooperation can emerge without resort to external coercion.
54
  
                                                 
50
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51
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This is because actors are clearly conscious of what benefit they derive from the 
arrangement.
55
  The nature of the relationship issues an implicit appeal to their self-
interest; thus, the lure of reciprocal benefit encourages compliance.  If the reciprocal 
quality to the relationship is clearly laid out, participants are less likely to be confused as 
to why they should comply in the absence of coercion.
56
  In a sense, the coercion is 
internal. 
 
In systems of commercial relations this principle is especially salient.  Commerce is 
wholly predicated upon reciprocity.  This principle in effect underpins the entire 
enterprise.  In voluntary commerce, reciprocity is the purpose of the interaction; it is the 
basic nature of exchange.  Further, in commercial interactions, parties are far more likely 
to be calculating their actions according to parameters of self-interest, and are therefore 
less likely to be guided by emotional considerations unrelated to profit and loss.  Within 
such a milieu, concepts of rational choice theory in fact more readily apply as commercial 
arrangements are, for the most part, more clearly premeditated, being constructed around 
a less nuanced agenda.  In commercial interaction, where the primary motivation for 
participation is unambiguously to glean individual profit, this weighing of expected costs 
and benefits is far more clear-cut.  The clarity of interests that arises from a relationship 
                                                                                                                                                 
recognition of mutual benefits, through exchanged agreements . . . to obey and participate in the 
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defined by reciprocity helps induce compliance.
57
  This principle of gain—a vitalizing 
force compelling the actions of rational actors—is commercial law‘s distinguishing 
mark.
58
 
 
2. Reciprocal Gain and Self-interest as the Root of All Law.   
To some extent, individual benefit lies at the heart of all forms of law, whether 
commercial in nature or not.  As Fuller expresses, ―Exchange is, after all, only a 
particular expression of this more general, and often more subtle, relationship [of 
reciprocity].‖59  Elsewhere he writes, ―the reciprocity out of which a given duty arises can 
be visible, as it were, in varying degrees.  At times it is obvious to those affected by it; at 
others it traces a more subtle and obscure course through the institutions and practices of 
society.‖60  Individual benefit is the primary engine of all norm emergence—the chief 
carrot.  Take criminal law as an example, something that on its surface seems well 
removed from this element of profit.  Arguably compliance with criminal codes is 
similarly motivated by self-interest and the pursuit of personal advantage.  This is 
compliance with rules so as to ultimately advance one‘s own personal safety (although 
admittedly this is a somewhat Hobbesian view of human nature).  At its most basic level, 
it is an exchange of sorts: I will not harm you if you do not harm me.  All law in this way 
can be said to be in a sense contractual.  And, indeed, like commerce, it too is predicated 
on the control and protection of property, property here being property in truly its most 
basic sense: the integrity of the physical person.   
 
                                                 
57
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58
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Hayek indeed has a more general conception of property, seeing it as the basis of law in 
the sense of universal rules of conduct.  For him notions of property ―determine 
boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down rules that enable each to ascertain 
where he is free to act.‖61  In this sense, the reciprocal recognition of property, property in 
even the most abstract sense, is the basis of all forms of law.  In the words of Hayek, 
―Law, liberty, and property are an inseparable trinity.‖62  Thus, individual benefit gleaned 
from a basic acknowledgment of ownership (i.e. property of any kind) underlies the 
formulation of all law.  Hayek writes in Law, Legislation and Liberty,  ―Property, in the 
wide sense in which it is used to include not only material things . . . is the only solution 
men have yet discovered to the problem of reconciling individual freedom with the 
absence of conflict.‖63  He goes on to assert that ―the recognition of property preceded the 
rise of even the most primitive cultures, and . . . certainly has grown up on the basis of 
that spontaneous order of actions which is made possible by the delimitation of protected 
domains of individual or groups.‖64  In one sense then, all law addresses issues of 
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property, from criminal law to family law, to constitutional law.  All law may be said to 
be contractual in nature, concerning questions of property.
65
  
 
Such a broad understanding of the term ‗property‘ is consistent with much of the law and 
economic analysis of law literature.
66
  After all, what is law but a vast consensus to abide 
by certain rules, much in the same way a contract entails the consent of two or more 
parties to align their behavior in accordance to the stipulations of an agreement? Indeed, 
the ―social contract‖ can be said to be a contract in a very real sense of the word.  We 
might think of it as a standard form contract, incrementally drawn up by the social order 
as a monolithic whole, to which members of the public, through their participation in 
society, give their implied consent.  In the case of a formal contract, what we have is 
essentially a more limited instance of this same process—but the same paradigm is 
evident: rules are drawn up and parties agree to adhere to those rules because it provides 
a certain measure of reciprocal benefit. 
                                                 
65
 Posner in particular adopts a singular commercial approach to the adjudication of law in arguing that 
economic considerations form the underlying rationale to the workings of the entire common law.  For 
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3. The Unique Nature of Commercial Law.   
However, as we have said, commercial activity is unique as this principle of benefit is 
commerce‘s chief characteristic.  In stark and unequivocal terms, it is its defining feature.  
In the realm of commerce, it thus emerges as a far more quantifiable phenomenon.  Gain 
is the sole reason for the activity.  With the emergence of law such as criminal law, there 
are arguably other factors that come into play, such as the human impulse towards moral 
conduct and so forth; in family law and constitutional law, there are the influences of 
social custom and fundamental political conceptions at work.  However, with commerce, 
what we have is a distilled version, an almost pure version of human self-interest.  And as 
such what emerges through the prism of commercial intercourse is a system of interaction 
based more or less exclusively on the principle of individual gain.  In commerce this 
principle of gain is the sole measure of efficiency.  The effect of this is that while to some 
extent this principle of self-interest may be found within all forms of law, in commercial 
law it is profoundly more manifest, and thus commercial law offers itself up as the 
definitive illustration of this phenomenon.  It is one extreme end of a spectrum, a far 
more tangible display of this dynamic, and thus may be clearly distinguished from all 
other forms of law.  This aspect of reciprocity is the core constituent of a self-regulating 
system of legal relationships.  Thus, commercial law is ideally calibrated to evolve and 
function without the necessity of resorting to the potency of state-backed coercion.   
 
4. Contractual Ordering, Customary Law, and Reciprocity.   
If commercial law stands at one extreme end of a spectrum in terms of the principle of 
reciprocity, customary law in the pure sense of the word lies at its absolute tip.  It can be 
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said that customary law is wholly grounded upon and constructed around the principle of 
reciprocity.
67
  In this respect, contractual ordering comes nearest to customary law in the 
pure sense of the term.  Indeed, Fuller described customary law as the inarticulate brother 
of contract.
68
  Being so close on this continuum, the same forces that induce the 
‗spontaneous‘ emergence of norms in systems of customary law are also present in 
contract-based law.  Contract-based law shares many of the basic characteristics of 
customary law, specifically its reliance upon the element of reciprocity.
69
  
 
Depending upon the definition one chooses to adopt, it can be said commercial law is in 
fact a certain incarnation of customary law.
70
  Contract law is a more explicitly 
articulated form of customary law, with terms precisely spelled out—its clear-headed 
brother.  I would argue that its preciseness, in fact, allows the underlying force of 
reciprocity to work with even greater effect; contract law‘s clarity of expression gives 
greater force to the element of reciprocity in the commercial relationships it creates.  In 
this sense then, contract-based law could be said to be even more responsive to this 
principle of reciprocity than customary law, which at times might present a relatively 
muddied expression of reciprocity, creating instead merely a vague sense that the norm 
seems socially appropriate; the element of reciprocity may at times get lost in the mix.  
                                                 
67
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This is not so with contract law.  As we have said, the unambiguous structure of a 
contractual relationship is one that is entirely oriented towards achieving some degree of 
mutual benefit.  Reciprocal benefit is its life‘s blood, the sole reason for its formation.  
This unequivocal nature, one predicated exclusively on the self-interest of the contracting 
parties, brings the element of reciprocity to the fore, establishing it as the basic governing 
principle under which parties coordinate their actions.  In agreeing on terms and 
arranging the rules that will oversee their interaction, the goal of achieving some kind of 
reciprocal benefit is the principle to which parties will turn.  Thus, reciprocity can be said 
to play an even greater role in contract-based relationships than any other kind of 
association.   
 
The parallels between contract and customary law were of great interest to Fuller.
71
  
Fuller wrote extensively on customary law, theorizing on its similarity with systems of 
contractual ordering.  In doing so, Fuller was concerned with certain forms of contract.  
Fuller focused on longer term contractual arrangements that allowed for the emergence of 
continuous cooperation between the contracting parties, such as partnership agreements, 
franchises, labor contracts, contracts for the long term supply of goods, and so forth.  He 
also included in this bank accounts, bonds, insurance policies, and other long-term 
contractual claims.
72
  For Fuller, these contractual arrangements possessed similar 
features with that of customary law in terms of their dependence upon reciprocity.   
 
These forms of contract and customary law are similar ―in that neither is imposed by a 
third party, or from above, as it were.  Both develop, rather, when a situation arises in 
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which the parties involved have or come to have needs that can be met through mutual 
reciprocation.‖73  This represents an important feature, as it is through an incremental 
process of interaction predicated upon reciprocity that norms in both forms of law 
emerge, essentially sidestepping the need for law to be created by a third party authority.  
In place of a legislature, the participants themselves formulate the pertinent rules.  In 
place of statute, the terms of their agreement dominate; parties essentially create their 
own ―statute‖ through the provisions they agree upon.  In contract as in customary law, 
norms evolve gradually from tacit understandings gleaned from repeated interaction.
74
  
 
In terms of enforcement, reciprocal benefit also plays a key role.  Customary law theory 
asserts that ―individual actors gradually come to embrace norms that they view as 
requisite to their collective wellbeing.‖75  In this way, the very reciprocal quality that 
ushers the arrangement into existence simultaneously serves as an enforcement 
mechanism, promoting compliance.  For the most part, the vast majority of contracts are 
fulfilled without having to go to court largely because ―they are mutually advantageous, 
not because of any threats of force.‖76  Arguably, many social norms stand apart from 
contract in that they are not legally enforceable.  However, this distinction falters when 
we consider that some forms of contract law also cannot be enforced.  For example, this 
would be the case where parties stipulate against judicial enforceability, or a term is too 
unclear to warrant such enforcement.  Nonetheless, such a contract may still be 
considered ―lawful.‖77  
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There is in contract and customary law an element of reciprocity underlying both forms 
of law.  If our specific customary law dictates that I should not play with live electrical 
wires in my yard while my neighbor is swimming in his pool, I would do so with the 
expectation that such a behavioral norm would be reciprocated when it is I who is 
swimming.  If I should turn off my cell phone in the theatre, I expect others to do the 
same.  Likewise, if our contract states I will deliver 1000 sticks of chewed gum to you on 
Tuesday with the expectation of payment, I would expect you to pay me if I manage to 
get 1000 sticks of chewed gum into your hands on Tuesday.  In all three instances, 
reciprocity undergirds the arrangement.  The rule evolves because it confers a degree of 
mutual benefit, and, equally, it is usually complied with because of this quality of 
reciprocal benefit.
78
    
 
To be sure, the element of reciprocity is more pronounced in systems of commercial law 
(as it is usually in customary law
79
).  This is because reciprocity emerges in commercial 
situations with such vivid clarity—it is their primary characteristic.  Commercial law is 
unique in the degree to which the element of reciprocity is active in it.  Reciprocity is an 
intrinsic feature of trade.  Let us now go on to examine how commercial regulation itself 
may in fact be conceptualized as an instrument of the market, shaped to a large extent by 
the very market forces that it seeks to administer. 
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B. Commercial Law as an Instrument Of The Market 
Seen through a certain lens, commercial law is arguably not in fact the product of laws at 
all, but rather the product of market forces—inevitable corollaries that arise in 
conjunction with and assist commercial activity.  Indeed, Benson argues that commercial 
law should be understood in precisely this way.
80
  A commercial system is in its essence 
―an evolving process of interaction and reciprocity which is simultaneously facilitated by 
and leads to an evolving system of commercial law.‖81  This view of commercial law 
holds that ―evolving trade practices [provide] the primary rules of evolving commercial 
law.‖82  Commercial law ―develops directly from the market exchange process as 
business practice and custom evolves.‖83  That is to say, commerce is not merely subject 
to law; law (at least commercial law) is, to a great extent, subject to commerce.  It is, in a 
manner of speaking, an instrument of the market.   
 
1. Fuller‘s Horizontal Law and Hayek‘s Order of Actions.   
In The Morality of Law, Fuller emphasizes law not only as an enterprise, but one that in 
fact mirrors the market order.
84
  In doing so, he cites the significance of customary law
85
 
as a framework of spontaneously evolving rules arising from a dynamic process of 
dispute arbitration and adjudication.
86
  Like Bruno Leoni, Fuller recognizes a certain 
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advantage in the self-coordinating properties of customary law.
87
  This Fuller calls an 
example of ―horizontal forms of order‖ contrasted with ―vertical‖ systems of order 
imposed by the state.
88
  Unlike ―vertical‖ law, horizontal forms of order are not 
predicated upon coercion.  Thus, ―just as a society may have rules imposed on it from 
above, so it may also reach out for rules by a kind of inarticulate collective preference.‖89  
In Fuller‘s view then, there is a sense that law is in fact most compatible with the market 
order.  Indeed, many scholars have noted the similarity in the spontaneous manner in 
which the body of law that regulates the market and the market itself evolve.
90
  
 
In his 1973 seminal work, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek puts forward a similar 
notion regarding law.  Discussing the emergence of order, Hayek contends there are two 
ways in which order can originate: ―made‖ and ―grown‖ order.91  The latter demonstrates 
a degree of similarity to the concept that underpins Fuller‘s notion of horizontal forms of 
order.  For these two forms of order, Hayek uses the Greek terms taxis to denote made 
order, and kosmos for a grown order.
92
  Hayek explains that a made order may ―be 
described as a construction, an artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a 
directed social order, as an organisation.‖93  Legislated law would fall under this 
category.  He describes this as an exogenous order.  Hayek continues, ―The grown order, 
on the other hand, which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is 
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in English most conveniently as a spontaneous order.‖94  Hayek distinguishes between the 
―order of actions‖ and the ―order of rules,‖ suggesting that in the same fashion that a 
particular order of action may arise from a pre-existing pattern of social behavior, the 
order of rules may also emerge spontaneously and without the requirement for deliberate 
design.
95
  Hayek argues that although the rules upon which a spontaneous order rests may 
be deliberately made, these rules may similarly be of spontaneous origin.
96
 
 
2. Early traces of Spontaneous Law Theory.   
The idea that law can arise from the spontaneous ordering of market activities is a 
significant contribution of Hayek.  Constituents of the idea, however, can be traced back 
much earlier.  Indeed the concept that law should evolve largely spontaneously in a 
decentralized fashion is a core principle within the common law.  In fact, it is arguably its 
defining characteristic.  Within a loose framework of statute, the common law grows 
through judicial precedent in an almost organic fashion, the product of countless 
individual contributions to its overall progression.
97
  The belief that, because of this, the 
law displays an ―inner wisdom‖ and greater rationality as it emerges slowly from an array 
of specific cases, and thus is better able to accommodate a vast multiplicity of facts and 
circumstances—is a central tenet of English common law.98  In this sense, it is superior 
because it is the product of many minds.  Describing this distinctive feature of the 
common law, Sir Matthew Hale, the renowned 17
th
 century English jurist explained, "it is 
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a reason for me to preferre a Lawe by which a Kingdome hath been happily governed 
four or five hundred yeares than to adventure the happiness and Peace of a Kingdome 
upon Some new Theory of my owne."
99
  This assertion has a striking parallel with more 
modern economic theories regarding the development and equilibrium of market systems.   
 
While in the latter half of the 20th century this notion of jurisprudence was greatly 
expanded upon and tied to economic principles by Hayek, it is in fact grounded upon the 
earlier theories of Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Edmund Burke.
100
  It 
is in the work of these thinkers that we first discern the nascent concept of spontaneous 
social order.  Of these, perhaps Adam Smith is best known for advancing this position.  In 
the Wealth of Nations, Smith posits a theory of economic society that possesses a self-
regulating system of spontaneous order.
101
  And this order, in his view, arises naturally in 
an unpremeditated fashion from a confluence of disparate forces unintentionally working 
in coordination with one another.
102
  This blind interdependence brings about a 
spontaneous order—an ―invisible hand‖ that guides the market place.  Smith explains that 
as each individual member pursues his own limited interests ―he is in this, as in many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention.‖103  Describing the same phenomenon, Adam Ferguson defines this process as 
one that stems largely from a phrase later adoptedand made famous by Hayek ―the result 
of human action, but not the execution of any human design.‖104  
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3. Menger, Hayek, and the Austrian School of Economics.   
The economist Carl Menger has a similar notion regarding jurisprudence.  Menger 
conceptualizes law as an example of what he calls ―organic‖ phenomenon, the aggregate 
result of natural processes.
105
  Menger opines that ―law, even the state itself . . . and 
numerous other social structures are already met with in epochs of history where we 
cannot properly speak of purposeful activity of the community as such directed at 
establishing them.‖106  Hayek is more adversarial in his appraisal.  Hayek condemns what 
he views as the argument of ―constructivist rationalism,‖107 which he sees as 
underpinning the legal positivist position, stating that the argument is grounded upon ―the 
fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some mind, and that it is possible to 
construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order.‖108  Hayek 
argues that within the field of economics, the price mechanism works to synchronize the 
diverse and limited knowledge of each individual member, allowing a spontaneous self-
organization to emerge.  Hayek coined the awkward term ―catallaxy‖ to describe this 
self-organizing system of voluntary co-operation.
109
  For an economist like Hayek 
                                                 
105
 Norman, supra note 97, at 31. 
106
 CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO ECONOMICS 146 (1985). 
107
 HAYEK, supra note 13, at 8-34. 
108
 Id. at 14. 
109
 Hayek derived the word ―Catallaxy‖ from the Greek verb katallasso (καταλλάσσω) meaning ―to 
exchange,‖ ―to admit in the community‖ and ―to change from enemy into friend.‖ F.A. HAYEK, THE 
MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 108-09 (1976). 
  
To refer to the complex system that assures coordination of individuals‘ acts Hayek uses 
the term spontaneous order or catallaxy.  According to him, spontaneous order consists of 
those institutions that are the result of human action but not the result of some specific 
human intention.  In other words, spontaneous order or catallaxy is a network of firms 
and households and has no specific purpose of its own; rather it serves as a process by 
which individuals and organizations pursue their own purposes.  Catallaxy is that which 
results naturally from the interaction of firms and households through the market 
exchange.  
 
Judit Kapás, The Coordination Problems, the Market and the Firm, 2 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 13, 20 (2006) (citation omitted).   
  28 
observing the emergence of order within the subtle and highly interconnected flux of 
market systems, the possibility of law arising more or less spontaneously from the 
mechanics of economic forces was not only feasible, it was the most likely outcome.  
This idea of spontaneous order in fact became central to the Austrian school of 
economics‘ reformulation of economic theory (in which Menger and Hayek are key 
figures).
110
  At the core of classical liberalism lies the belief that from an unfettered 
market system, a spontaneous order of cooperation in exchanging goods and services can 
develop.
111
  Indeed, the notion that order can emerge as the product of the voluntary 
actions of a multitude of individuals operating in blind coordination, and not through the 
legislative maneuvering of the state—is a key idea in the classical liberal and free market 
tradition; it is a basic premise of libertarianism, and continues to be to this day.
112
  
 
4. Understanding Commercial law as an invisible hand.   
This represents a significant shift away from the more traditional conceptions of law 
espoused by legal positivism.  Benson argues that the development of commercial law 
can be likened to the natural evolution of commercial systems.  In The Spontaneous 
Evolution of Commercial Law, Benson contends that similar to ―the invisible hand‖ 
explanation for the emergence of market systems, commercial law evolves because it 
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facilitates commercial activity, making it more efficient.
113
  Benson writes, ―Commercial 
law itself is analogous to the price system in that it facilitates interaction and makes 
exchange more efficient.  The underlying mechanics are also analogous.  Commercial 
law develops directly from the market exchange process as business practice and custom 
evolves.‖ 114 
 
Benson contends that commercial regulation is as Hayek maintains, ―the result of human 
action but not of human design.‖115  Thus, commercial law is, in a very real sense, an 
instrument of the market, emerging in reaction to the same forces that shape commerce.  
Commercial law is not so much imposed by an external authority, but rather evolves 
spontaneously subject to the internal mechanisms that underlie commercial systems.  It is, 
to a degree, a voluntarily produced body of law.  Bentham famously wrote that ―before 
the [state‘s] law there was no property, take away the law, all property ceases.‖116  
However, within the realm of commercial law, there is arguably more to the story than 
this.  Certainly, some law is necessary to regulate the exchange of property and the 
enforcement of property rights, but this may not be such a one-way relationship.  In a 
sense, commerce, in turn, produces and shapes the law that evolves to regulate it. 
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5. Spontaneous Legal Evolution and the Law Merchant, Old and New.   
In advocating for the plausibility of the spontaneous evolution of commercial law, 
Benson takes particular notice of the development of the medieval Law Merchant.
117
  In 
many respects, the Law Merchant exemplifies the ability of commerce to generate law in 
response to commercial needs.  The Law Merchant evolved from common usage rather 
than from official edict.  The Law Merchant was a creation of the market, facilitating the 
machinery of trade.  Commerce was, in this sense, not just subject to the edicts of the 
Law Merchant, the Law Merchant was also subject to commerce.  The Law Merchant is a 
clear example of a system of ―spontaneous‖ law arising from the maelstrom of repeated 
and sustained commercial interaction—not the artifact of a central authority predicated 
upon coercion, but rather the living creation of the market itself. 
 
In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, merchants across vast swaths of Europe 
broke the bonds of political constraints and created an international system of law to 
facilitate the burgeoning system of trade developing in their midst.
118
  By the eleventh 
century, every aspect of commercial trade in Europe, and even beyond the borders of the 
continent, was governed by the principles of the Law Merchant.  This system of law was 
―voluntarily produced, voluntarily adjudicated and voluntarily enforced.‖119  Scholars 
trace its absorption by the common law during the rise of the modern state, and the 
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eventual reemergence of the law merchant as a primary force in current international 
commercial trade, where it still continues to evolve.
120
  Benson concludes that ―evolving 
trade practices provided the primary rules of evolving commercial law.‖121  The body of 
law that emerged was a response to the requirements of the market; its overarching 
orientation was that of facilitating the act of commerce.  This was done incrementally and 
in a decentralized fashion.  It was as Benson argues, a process that ―evolved without the 
design of any absolute authority‖ because it ―facilitate[d] interaction and ma[de] 
exchange more efficient.‖122  ―The law,‖ Trackman informs us, ―did little more than echo 
the existing sentiments of the merchant community.‖123  The rules of the Law Merchant 
were an expression of the commercial practices merchants themselves instituted in order 
to facilitate exchange between them.  Indeed, at its core, market forces created and 
sustained the Law Merchant.   
 
The Law Merchant, however, did not die with the emergence of the modern state; it was 
merely co-opted by national laws, and transformed.
124
  It was subsumed by national 
commercial law codes.  The Law Merchant remained the principal source of commercial 
law in both the Common law and Civil law systems,
125
 and has now reemerged in our 
present age.  To some extent national law has fragmented the Law Merchant in its current 
incarnation, but it nevertheless continues to exist.
126
  We are now witnessing the growth 
of a ―new‖ Law Merchant, suggestive of its medieval counterpart.127  ―Like the medieval 
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Law Merchant, a twenty-first century Law Merchant is evolving that is cosmopolitan in 
nature and transcends the parochial interests of nation states.‖128  
 
As in medieval Europe, the existence of diverse regional legal jurisdictions represents a 
considerable obstruction to those engaging in trade across borders.
129
  Business 
recognizes this.  Thus, the ―general trend of commercial law [has been] to move away 
from the restrictions of national law to a universal, international conception of law of 
international trade.‖130  As with its forefather, the core philosophy of the modern Law 
Merchant ―is pragmatism: commercial law is grounded in commercial practice directed at 
market efficiency and privacy . . . free from inefficient government intrusion.  In line with 
this, mercantile disputes [are] resolved functionally and privately in light of commercial 
practice, not [through] state impositions on that practice.‖131  The ability of merchants to 
regulate their dealings through ―their own business practices, their contracts, their 
customs and their usages‖132 is increasingly valued.  In many respects, modern 
international commerce is governed by regulation largely the creation of the commercial 
sector itself.
133
 
 
The widespread use of dispute resolution as an alternative to local courts is testament to 
this.  By the middle part of the last century, approximately seventy-five percent of 
commercial disputes were settled through arbitration.
134
  Today, it is standard practice for 
parties to write arbitration clauses into their contracts.  Approximately ―90 percent of 
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international trade contracts written in the early 1990s contained arbitration clauses.‖135  
Parties select arbitrators to apply the parties' choice of law.  These arbitrators are chosen 
for their commercial expertise and tasked with conducting arbitral hearings ―in light of 
merchant practice and trade usage.‖136  Many international trade associations offer 
internal conflict resolution procedures.
137
  The International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) has created ―a substantial arbitration institution.‖138  Such arbitration is strikingly 
pragmatic, exhibiting an underlying recognition of the accepted business practices of 
those immersed in the enterprise of international trade.
139
    
 
Indeed, the basic components of the Law Merchant are alive and well: contract, trade 
usage, and commercial arbitration.  In many ways, the basic principles of international 
commercial law are a current reflection of the medieval law merchant: choice of 
arbitration institutions, procedures, arbitrators and applicable law, and an overarching 
deference to recognized business customs and usages.  These principles exist in response 
to the requirements of merchants engaging in trade.  The Law Merchant, past and present, 
informs us that commercial law is, in many respects, an instrument of the market; indeed, 
it is forged in part by the very commercial interaction it seeks to regulate.  Law related to 
commercial interaction emerges centered around the principle of reciprocity, not as the 
parent, but as the child of the market.   
 
To be sure, the principle of reciprocity emerges very clearly in commercial interaction, 
encouraging the formation of and compliance with the rules people formulate to govern 
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their relations.  However, a high level of overall engagement is a key component in this 
as it accentuates the effects of reciprocity on traders‘ dealings with one another.  Fuller 
writes, ―the bond of reciprocity unites men.‖140  True enough, but the bond of reciprocity 
becomes that much more powerful as people are thrust into engaged, repeated interaction 
with each other.  Reciprocity is crucial in systems of law lacking external coercion; its 
importance is well appreciated among spontaneous law theorists.  The significance in the 
manner of engagement, and how it enhances the effects of reciprocity, however, is less 
understood.  This all-important manner of engagement is what we will turn to next, and 
serves as the central focus of the remainder of this paper.   
 
III. THE ELEMENT OF HIGH ENGAGEMENT 
 
A. The Concept of High Engagement Mapped out 
 
Let us now look at this element of high engagement—the theoretical focus of the paper.  
Actors in commercial activity demonstrate a generally higher level of engagement 
compared with other forms of regulated activities.  The importance of this fact cannot be 
overstated.  This characteristic of commercial dealings amplifies the effect of reciprocity 
on the emergence of legal norms.  Without it, the effects of reciprocity would not 
manifest as powerfully.
141
  Thus, seeking to explain norm evolution in commercial law, 
we must examine what relationship exactly the degree of engagement has with the ability 
of commercial systems to evolve and self-enforce.   
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What then exactly do we mean when we speak of engagement, and how is this unique to 
situations of trade and commerce? We are using the term engagement here to signify the 
extent to which players engage with one another and establish patterns of repeated and 
involved interaction.  As we will see, a higher level of overall engagement translates into 
a greater willingness to adhere to the rules of the game.  This high level of engagement 
comprises two interrelated aspects of commercial law.  These are: basic repetition and the 
creation of clear cycles of interaction.  In fact, these two aspects are inextricably linked; 
the second in effect paves the way for the emergence of the first.  The characteristic of 
repeated interaction is able to manifest as it does in commercial dealings because of the 
nature of the interaction itself.  While, for purposes of exposition, these two ideas are 
treated separately below, it should be borne in mind that they are intimately connected.  
As we will see, the creation of clear cycles of interaction enhances the interaction‘s 
ability to be repeated.  Let us look at repetition first. 
 
1. Repetition. 
Through their association, actors expand the general scope of their relations and repeat 
them, more and more frequently brushing up against situations that necessitate the 
involvement of rules to mediate their cooperative ventures.  Arguably, this is true of 
every form of law in the sense that the primary function of law is to provide guidelines to 
which the behavior of individuals must to some degree conform.  However, with 
commercial interaction it is different; commercial law is distinct in the sense that the 
players tend to be more frequently and consistently engaged in the activity (i.e. 
commercial trade) where it is often their very livelihood.  Participants voluntarily enter 
into specialized situations that demand the attention of specific rules, and they do so on 
  36 
an exceedingly frequent basis.  This stands in clear contrast to other areas of law such as 
criminal law or tort: most individuals will infrequently, if at all, find themselves in direct 
contact with those systems.  Further, while situations involving non-commercial law are 
more or less static, trade has the ability to both expand in scope and accelerate.  This high 
level of engagement intensifies the cohesive effects of reciprocity on the relationship, 
encouraging rule compliance simply because there are more cycles of interaction.
142
  To 
use once more the analogy of a saw, deeper grooves of cooperative norms are cut because 
the players run through the process more frequently—the blade is passed repeatedly over 
the spot.  Looking at commerce, we see that the sheer frequency of interaction is 
profoundly greater than in non-commercial situations.  To put is plainly: they are simply 
doing it more. 
 
There are several important points regarding this characteristic of repetition that I will 
point out in this section: (i) the interaction is often repeated with the same players; (ii) the 
frequency of repetition can increase; (iii) new partners and new interactions are sought 
out; and (iv) repetition has the effect of making players far more exposed to the law.   
 
i. Repeat with Same Players. 
The nature of commerce welcomes repetition.  Successful cooperation will usually lead to 
repeated dealings, further expanding relations, all the while deepening the contact and 
familiarity the players have with the relevant rules governing their ventures.  The 
tendency to target specific parties and engage in repeated dealings with them is a 
significant feature of commercial interaction as it plays a crucial role in inducing the 
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emergence of cooperation.  Ellickson contends that groups of ―[p]eople who repeatedly 
interact can generate [legal] institutions through communication, monitoring, and 
sanctioning.‖143  For Fuller, one of the general conditions under which customary law can 
evolve and persist is that the occasions for interaction ―must be sufficiently recurrent.‖144  
Fuller calls this ―the tacit commitments that develop out of interaction.‖145  Indeed, ―Such 
interactional practices are often open-ended and oblique at the outset, and become refined 
and fixed only by a gradual process of adjustment and accommodation.  They commonly 
‗glide into being imperceptibly‘ . . . .  The stabilized practices that ultimately emerge are 
typically tacit, yet recurrent.‖146  The fact that parties often repeat their interactions 
allows for the possibility of more sophisticated forms of cooperation between them.
147
  
This characteristic of repeated interaction with the same participants has important 
implications to situations that display a Prisoner‘s Dilemma-type situation (how this is so 
we will delve deeper into below).  In the realm of commerce, it is in fact an almost 
universal objective to construct cooperative relationships that can be repeated, and often 
the more frequent the interaction, the better.  This is not true for non-commercial law 
where there is no overarching effort to accelerate, expand, and repeat interactions. 
 
ii. Frequency Can Increase. 
A further important point to be made is that with commercial law the frequency that the 
players interact with one another can continue to increase, constrained only by relevant 
market situations.  There is, in theory, almost no ceiling to the extent of cooperation.  
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While patterns of non-commercial interaction are typically fixed and have no reason to 
increase, commercial interactions are often accelerated and repeated.  To do so is usually 
a primary objective.   
 
iii. Seek Out New Partners. 
Participants in commerce actively seek out new opportunities to construct new sets of 
relations with different parties.  Commerce is an exercise in ceaseless expansion and 
repetition.
148
  Not only does the same interaction have the potential to be repeated again 
and again, but successful interactions will often lead to new ventures, again involving 
recognition of certain rules.  As Benson explains, ―As the benefits from one bilateral 
relationship evolve, incentives to develop similar benefits with others arise and a loose 
knit group with intermeshing reciprocities begins to develop.‖149  New interactions create 
new opportunities for cooperation, not only with the original parties, but also with new 
participants.
150
  Likewise, opportunities for wholly new forms of interaction also emerge.  
One enterprise will frequently open a window to a new business venture, often with a 
new set of responsibilities and commitments.
151
  Thus, new contracts are formed to 
govern new forms of interaction. 
 
iv. More Exposed to Law. 
The end result of all this is significant.  The participants in commercial interaction are 
considerably more exposed to the relevant law.  In each interaction—dealings which 
often demand cooperation with parties they have little other relationship with beyond 
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trade—they rely steadfastly on the collectively recognized rules.  These rules serve as the 
chief constitution of their actions.  Participants, in this way, find themselves constantly 
engaged in situations where these conventions are of primary importance; they are 
repeatedly exposing themselves to these rules, and operating within an explicit legal 
context.  This is simply not the case for interaction governed by other areas of law.  To 
use the example of criminal law, how frequently does the average person really find 
herself in contact with it?  Perhaps once in her lifetime, if at all.
152
  The particular rules of 
family law or tort do not directly affect individuals on a regular basis.
153
  Certainly, 
shadows of the law exist minimally in the background of their lives to the extent of 
maintaining order within the societies they live.  However, law, for the most part, 
demands little or none of their explicit attention.  It is not something with which they are 
highly engaged. 
 
In contrast, communities of traders and merchants are in contact with commercial law on 
a daily basis where it is often their very livelihood.  As a result, the law is of primary 
importance to them.  They deal repeatedly with situations that explicitly demand 
adherence to certain rules, often tirelessly seeking to expand and increase these very 
situations.  This is the primary aim to which they orient themselves, day in and day out.  
The rules they establish and adhere to in these interactions form a fundamental and 
familiar substratum to their lives.  They are constantly engaged with these sets of rules, 
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frequently finding themselves in situations where they must resort to them to overcome 
obstacles that threaten the success of the relationships they construct.  Thus, these rules 
are of the utmost importance to them, permeating their daily lives. 
 
With each new cycle of cooperation, their mutual recognition and adherence to the set of 
rules they have chosen to govern their relationship is further established and deepened.  
In this way, behavioral conventions evolve and become further entrenched.
154
  In a sense, 
they are constructing legal norms with each relationship they foster.  In this respect, 
commercial interaction is markedly different from all other forms of interaction; there is 
in commercial intercourse a perpetual genesis of shifting responsibilities and duties to 
other individuals.  It is this unique characteristic of commercial interaction that defines 
commercial situations as possessing a high level of overall engagement.  And it is 
because players are more engaged in the specific activity that fixed behavioral norms can 
emerge.
155
   
 
2. Creating Cycles of Interaction 
There is, though, another important distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
law that should be pointed out here.  This is a second aspect of high engagement found in 
the basic nature of commercial interaction.  We must also consider the basic nature of the 
kind of action that commercial dealings produce.  Ultimately, frequency and repetition 
are very much related to the particular form the interaction takes.  The nature of 
commercial interaction in effect allows for extreme repetition.   
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There are several important components to this point that I will address in this section: (i) 
the manner of interaction itself allows for repetition; (ii) commercial interaction generates 
positive duties to act; (iii) commercial interaction serves as an arena to create law; (iv) 
commercial interaction is a delineated, clearly defined game that can be played out; (v) 
cooperation strategies and iterated games as applied to commercial interactions. 
 
i. Manner of Interaction Allows for Repetition. 
What is meant here by engagement is more than mere repetition.  It is important to 
understand what exactly is being repeated, and how it is being repeated; that is to say, the 
kind of action that is repeated.  High engagement thus also refers to the nature of the 
interaction, not just its frequency.  This is because the nature of the interaction itself 
allows for greater repetition—it lends itself to the possibility of more frequent repetition 
by providing a delineated cycle of interaction that may be run through again and again.  
Thus, the substantive nature of interaction regulated by commercial law merits further 
investigation.   
 
ii. Creation of Positive Duties to Act. 
In a way, the types of action required by commercial and non-commercial law are polar 
opposites.  In commercial law, participants are actively doing something, that is, they are 
engaging in an activity as opposed to merely refraining from doing something.  While 
non-commercial law, for the most part, regulates what people should not do, commercial 
law regulates what people are obliged to do (as well as what they should not do).  The 
distinction perhaps seems simple, even obvious, but its simplicity should not be confused 
for unimportance; it has profound implications.   
  42 
 
In The Principles of Social Order, Fuller touches briefly on the idea that particular forms 
of law can be distinguished in that they involve a certain call to action (though he is 
speaking of customary law in general): ―what is involved is not simply a negation, a 
prohibition of certain disapproved actions, but also the obverse side of this negation, the 
meaning it confers on foreseeable and approved actions, which then furnish a point of 
orientation for ongoing interactive responses.‖156  This applies perfectly to the laws that 
regulate commercial interaction—specifically contract law.  Like Fuller, I am here 
referring not to contract law in the traditional sense as in the law of contract, but to the 
―law‖ that a contract itself brings into being.157  Patterns of commercial interaction are 
distinct from all other forms of law where legal injunctions are couched in purely 
negative terms, incurring penalty if violated: for example, the criminal law‘s universal 
prohibition against murder, or tort law‘s against nuisance or trespass.158  Commercial law, 
in addition to the threat of sanctions, creates positive obligations between parties.  It is 
wholly unique in this sense.
159
  It not only regulates how parties are to interact, essentially 
―criminalizing‖ certain behavior, it actively promotes the formation of completely new 
duties between agents, promoting new forms of association.
160
  To put it colloquially: 
with commercial law, actors are actually actively doing something, while in other forms 
of law, they are not doing anything; rather they are refraining from doing something—an 
important distinction.  Flipping through the criminal code of any nation state one will find 
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scant few, if any, actual positive legal obligations towards other individuals.  Non-
commercial law is what one must not do to other individuals; it is not what one must do.  
That is, it is the maintenance of a certain social order as opposed to the proactive 
generation of wholly new cooperative structures.  The basic distinction here is that law 
that arises from some sort of contractual union between parties builds new relationships, 
while virtually all other forms of law, for the most part, merely regulate existing 
relationships.
161
  This is a fundamental distinction, and for our purposes, an important 
one, as this structure to commercial law pulls participants into a higher level of 
engagement with the law in that it greatly expands the points of contact between 
individuals that require specific forms of regulation.  And, in so doing, induces the 
emergence of stable legal norms, conventions on which to model one‘s behavior—all 
without the need of a central legislative body to enact law. 
 
In commercial law, we have a specific well-defined kind of interaction that definite rules 
explicitly regulate.  This is not so much the case in human relationships outside of 
commerce, where the manner in which parties are to interact is not as clearly mapped out; 
only injunctions are offered.
162
  What we have with commerce is essentially the 
wholesale creation of new networks of relationships, one that targets a specific end and is 
exceedingly specialized.
163
  In this way, it is the generation of new forms of interaction, 
positive duties to act, and not simply the regulation of existing relationships that are 
largely framed in the negative—injunctions against certain acts.  That is, non-commercial 
law, for the most part, is the regulation of human interaction that already exists, while 
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commercial regulation is in fact the further formation of kinds of interaction.  It is the 
active construction of a system of cooperation over and above mere prohibitions against 
harming other individuals.  It instead seeks to aid in individuals‘ efforts at new forms of 
cooperation.  This is an important distinction.  In a sense, commercial society is 
something we create through the enterprise of trade, and is something that stands almost 
separate to the standard set of interactions that can be observed in society.  It is an 
appendage, something that through our actions we are continually creating.   
 
In so doing, we are essentially fashioning new avenues of human interaction, which in 
turn give rise to new systems of regulation to govern those relationships, assigning duties 
and responsibilities where previously there were none.  These arrangements, with their 
myriad of obligations between parties, pull individuals, or sometimes-vast collections of 
individuals, into complex compositions of cooperation.  These legal relationships are 
constantly being generated, with new forms of association arising continuously with each 
new commercial interaction.  This constant flow of collaboration ensures the high 
engagement of the participants because they are called to act, rather than simply asked to 
refrain from acting.  Within such networks of association, it is not enough to simply go 
about one‘s business so long as one does not interfere with others.  Rather, one‘s business 
is, in a sense, the business of others.  In commercial arrangements, one essentially 
commits oneself to an array of responsibilities towards other individuals.  Within this 
sphere of interaction, one‘s duties to others extend beyond simply not harming others 
through theft or physical injury.  In no other areas of law do we witness such a wholesale 
construction of responsibilities and duties to other parties. 
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iii. Arena to Create Law. 
This more active and engaged nature of commercial law puts participants in a better 
position to ―create‖ legal norms.  Owing to the engaged nature of trade, players have 
more opportunities to develop systems of cooperation characterized by a pattern of 
responses and counter-responses.
164
  They are actively engaging with one another, 
creating a venue where law, in the sense of legal norms that relate to their specific 
interaction, can be constructed through their actions.  Through their individual 
participation, actors contribute to an incremental evolution of the law.  Parties‘ ability to 
form contracts tailored to the specific manner of association in which they find 
themselves allows players to essentially construct law.   
 
There are of course countless examples of this.  Consider the drafting of non-performance 
clauses in international crude oil contracts.  These force majeure clauses are expressed in 
detailed terms, and each clause is formulated in the light of the unique requirements of 
the crude oil industry itself.
165
  These provisions are specifically crafted by traders with 
an intimate knowledge of the industry, in order to establish contractual consequences that 
will ensue as a consequence of such things as political unrest, insurrection, or 
nationalization.
166
  These clauses often include other considerations highly peculiar to the 
oil industry, such as oil spills, pipeline blockages, the arrest or restraint of princes, and 
the unavailability of crude oil as the result of the election of a government that seizes 
royalty crude oil.
167
  These clauses are adopted in response to the demands of 
international transactions.  They ―comply with prior practices, involving past occurrences 
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in world trade; and they embody new practices, reflecting current events in the energy 
market.‖168  Such clauses have evolved into standard provisions in modern international 
crude oil contracts; one example of how commercial actors themselves through the 
structuring of contracts tailored to their particular circumstances may influence the 
creation of general legal norms.  In fact, distinct sets of transnational commercial law 
have emerged for ―specialized areas of international business and trade such as a 'lex 
petrolia' for the international oil-industry, a 'lex numerica' or 'lex informatica' for 
international data interchange, a 'lex constructionis' for the international construction 
industry and a 'lex maritima' for international maritime practice.‖169  All of these are 
examples of how, through the drafting of their contracts, private parties are persistently 
engaged in the active generation of highly specialized normative standards.   
 
iv. Commercial Trade as a Delineated Game: Game Creation. 
Unlike non-commercial activities, in commerce new systems of cooperation are 
constantly being formed.  In other aspects of life, relationships between individuals are 
for the most part static and fixed.  In commerce we have instead continually evolving 
subsystems of cooperation—new patterns of interaction.  The most important point to 
take away from this, however, is that this will affect the system‘s ability to generate 
cooperation between individual actors.  It does this by opening the door to a certain 
clarity regarding repetition.  That is, there is something being actively done that can be 
repeated.  The act of actively doing something, as opposed to refraining from doing 
something, has specific consequences regarding stimulating cooperation between parties.  
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Repetition of interaction induces the emergence of norms and compliance with them.
170
  
This generation of norms and compliance arises from repeatedly running through cycles 
of interaction.  In the sense that commercial law generates clearly delineated cycles of 
interaction, cycles that are typically repeated again and again, it reinforces this process of 
norm creation through repetition.  Thus, when we speak of repetition, we are speaking of 
the repetition of cycles of interaction, and commercial law, specifically contract, 
constructs clear cycles of interaction.   
 
Trakman concludes that time plays a formative role in the emergence of trade custom 
and, ultimately, into its solidification into legal norms: ―time fosters the growth of inter-
party practices.  Time permits practices to crystallize into business usage and ultimately 
into trade custom.‖171  This is absolutely true.  Over time, trade practices will emerge and 
gain an increasingly widespread acceptance.
172
  However, while Trakman sees the 
decisive mechanism here as time, I would submit that it is not time per se, but rather the 
act of repeating cycles of engagement in which parties rely on these norms that actually 
induces this occurrence.  Time is merely an approximate metric with which to get a sense 
of how many cycles of interaction have occurred.  Thus, I would argue that it is more 
accurate to speak of cycles of engagement, or repetition, than merely time.  And 
commercial law, by its nature, allows for heightened cycles of defined interactions. 
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The process of contract is essentially the creation of a delineated, clearly defined cycle of 
interaction.  Because parties are actively engaged in these interactions, these cycles of 
interaction allow for intricate systems of cooperation to develop and evolve.
173
  It 
provides a demarcated set of actions that, in effect, facilitates the emergence of norms 
and subsequent compliance with them; the process of actively doing something within the 
scope of a delineated sequence of interaction creates an arena in which cooperation can 
evolve.
174
  In the language of game theory, it is a clearly defined game, or period of a 
game.
175
  There is a clear cycle of interaction to be completed by the players.  Thus, it is 
clear when actors have gone through a finished cycle.  Commerce is game creation.  That 
through the constraints of a game situation players can develop cooperation strategies has 
been well studied by notable names such as Maynard Smith
176
 (in the field of biology) as 
well as Axelrod and Hamilton.
177
  Significant contributions to the analysis of the 
evolution of social conventions have been made by philosophers such as Lewis and 
Ullman-Margalit.
178
  More recent attempts at applying game theory to the evolution of 
legal norms have been made by Ellickson,
179
 Parisi,
180
 Posner,
181
 McAdams,
182
 and 
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Cooter,
183
 to name only a few.  In that a contract-based relationship is a delineated game, 
the principles of game theory apply quite readily.  Contract is essentially defining, in 
explicit terms, a ―game‖ to be played by the participants.  Each stage and sequence of the 
―game‖ is laid out before hand, contingencies are anticipated, possible outcomes of the 
―game‖ are addressed.  A very specific sequence of response and counter-response is 
stipulated.  Put plainly, the rules of contract are the rules of a precise game to be played 
by the participants.  In playing these games, parties repeatedly run through rounds of 
interaction, and this assists in the generation of norms.  Put still another way, by defining 
a complete cycle of interaction, it allows for repetition as it provides something that can 
be easily repeated.  With other forms of law, the activity at issue is not a clearly defined 
purposive interaction that parties can complete.
184
  Rather, the activity is one of inaction, 
of refraining from doing something.  It is therefore not as clear when a cycle has 
completed itself.  More often than not, it is a situation without any clear end; instead, it is 
an ongoing process of refraining from some action or another.   
 
Consider a simple analogy involving two situations: scenario A and scenario B.  Scenario 
A here represents commercial interaction, and scenario B non-commercial interaction.  In 
scenario A I ask you to call me everyday at exactly 9:00 pm, let the phone ring once and 
hang up, after which I will promptly call you back and give you a time to call again the 
following day.  In scenario B, I simply ask you to never call me.  In scenario A there will 
emerge definite cycles of interaction that will lead to further cycles of dealings, i.e., a 
system of cooperation.  With scenario B, it is not as clear when we have run through a 
                                                                                                                                                 
182
 Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009). 
183
 Cooter, supra note 6, at 215; Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic 
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). 
184
 See Fuller, supra note 26, at 213-14. 
  50 
pattern of interaction.  The interaction as it were is not a clearly delineated and sequenced 
―game,‖ but rather is one game that is ongoing.   
 
It should be acknowledged that contracts often stipulate that parties must refrain from 
certain actions.  In this example, one could argue that not calling everyday conveys 
compliance; however, it still would not be as clear a signal as actively calling me 
(perhaps you just forgot all about me).  Contracts will, however, typically tether inaction 
to a specific time or event, which nevertheless still allows the ―game‖ to be sequenced.  
In doing so, a sequence of cooperation can still arise, as it will be clear when compliance 
(inaction in this case) has been observed and the game (or a stage of it) has concluded.  
That is, even if a contract demands inaction, the terms of the contract will still create a 
clear delineated game to be played.  With scenario B we are forever stuck on this one 
phase of interaction; there is no active construction of a system of repeated cooperation.  
We are stuck perpetually in one game period.  There is no interplay in the sense of a 
sequence of actions to be performed.  The game is not an iterated game, as they say in 
game theory parlance.
185
  Alas, this is the case with commercial and non-commercial 
interaction.  There is a profound difference between them.  The difference is one of 
engagement, that is, in actively doing something, and doing so in clear stages. 
 
In fact, to modify scenario B so that it is a more accurate reflection of the kind of 
interaction typically regulated by non-commercial law, I would not even designate a 
particular person to not call me, but rather simply declare to society as a whole that no 
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one should ever call me.  Group size will inevitably come into play.
186
  While in a very 
small group this might not be an issue, as an individual will have a pretty good idea of 
whom potential collaborators are, in large groups it will not even be clear who the 
participants in the game are.  In a large group, commercial partnership essentially carves 
out a small group of collaborators from this larger pool, clearly designating the players.  
This is illustrated by scenario A.  The situation in our modified scenario B is open-ended 
and imprecise, players are unclear, and there is no delineated game created as a result.  
This is, in fact, the nature of non-commercial law.  Thus, in these forms of law, a cycle is 
not as clearly defined as it is in commercial interactions, where a game is explicitly 
delineated.  As famously established by Axelrod, the ability to run through repeated 
―games‖ helps create cooperative norms and a willingness to comply with these norms as 
players place a greater value on the benefits of continued cooperation.  This is a very 
important point.  In contrast, non-commercial law does not involve the creation of small 
chunks of interaction, that is, intact games that can be played out.   
 
v. Cooperation Strategies and Iterated Games. 
The idea that commercial law can be thought of as the creation of repeated games is an 
intriguing and complex notion.  It is one that probably deserves a far more detailed 
discussion regarding game theory than can be presented here.  However, an attempt is 
made to outline the bare fundamentals of the idea below.  Commercial cooperation (for 
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the most part) represents a non-zero sum game.
187
  That is, one party‘s benefit does not 
have to come at the expense of the other party; both parties may glean some mutual 
advantage from their arrangement, as there is a collective creation of wealth.  In most 
situations this reciprocal gain will ensure norm compliance.  However, the problem arises 
in situations where this dynamic breaks down and a Prisoner‘s Dilemma188 scenario 
emerges, where there is a ―conflict between self-interest and the common good.‖189  In a 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma cooperation will provide mutual benefit, but the opportunity is 
present for one party to grab a little more at the direct expense of the other party, and 
aggravating this, one cannot be guaranteed that the other party is not contemplating the 
very same thing.  The dilemma is that the ―two individuals can each either cooperate or 
defect. . . . No matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection yields a higher 
payoff than cooperation.‖190  This sabotages the emergence of cooperation.  In such 
situations, defection will invariably become the dominant strategy over cooperation, 
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forming a Nash Equilibrium of non-cooperation.
191
  This ―dilemma‖ represents a distinct 
obstacle in situations where there is no third-party enforcement.
192
  As Axelrod and 
Hamilton write in their ground-breaking paper ―The Evolution of Cooperation,‖ ―With 
two individuals destined never to meet again, the only strategy that can be called a 
solution to the game is to defect always despite the seemingly paradoxical outcome that 
both do worse than they could have had they cooperated.‖193  In the case of Prisoner 
Dilemma games ―played only once, no strategy can invade the strategy of pure defection. 
. . . in the single-shot Prisoner‘s Dilemma, to defect always is an evolutionarily stable 
strategy.‖194  In an isolated interaction there is no escape from this.195 
 
The well-known solution to this dilemma, of course, is to make the situation an iterated 
game.
196
  Indeed, ―[r]epeated interactions give rise to incentives that differ fundamentally 
from those of isolated interactions.‖197  Knowing that a greater benefit may be derived 
from future cycles of cooperation with the other party, agents have an incentive to forgo a 
short-term gain that may be achieved through defection.  This in fact was the finding of 
Axelrod and Hamilton: cooperative strategies (of which tit-for-tat is perhaps the best 
known) can emerge if the game comprises many periods of play, and parties expect their 
current interaction will be but one incident in a series of future interactions.
198
  After all, 
who would you be more inclined to trust: a mechanic fixing you car in a distant town you 
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encountered while traveling, or the mechanic on the corner of your street, whom you see 
and do business with every day? This principle of permanence and duration has evolved 
to the point of an axiom among game theorists: ―One-shot encounters encourage 
defection; frequent repetition encourages cooperation.‖199 
 
In the language of game theorists, as discount factors (the value placed on subsequent 
periods) increase and time horizons (the time of potential repeated interaction) broaden, a 
greater premium is placed upon maintaining a relationship of cooperation.  The discount 
factor plays a pivotal role.  The discount factor is a function of a player‘s time preference 
and the probability of future interactions.
200
  Situations ―promoting a high probability of 
future interaction and low time preference are therefore more likely to induce optimizing 
equilibria.  In the case of a one-shot game, on the other hand, the probability of future 
interaction is zero.  So that the expected value of future cooperation is also zero.‖201  
 
This is precisely the dynamic we witness in commerce.  Long-term contractual business 
relationships are grounded upon the prospect of continued future cooperation.  
Commercial interaction, in this sense, is an iterated game situation.  The tendency to 
expand and increase the scope of these relationships with the same partners prevents a 
defection strategy from becoming dominant.  As commercial relationships are essentially 
repeated games, parties with ―selfish objectives might nevertheless behave cooperatively 
and efficiently . . . .‖202  Certainly the trust that develops between two commercial parties 
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is typically not trust in the generic sense, but rather, it is that both parties ―trust‖ that the 
other party has determined that long-term future cooperation is in their own interest.  As 
Axelrod points out, in commercial exchanges ―business ethics are maintained by the 
knowledge that future interactions are likely to be affected by the outcome of the current 
exchange.‖203 
 
The inherent nature of commercial interaction is oriented towards repetition, and as such, 
is a process of iterated-game creation.  Even in so-called one-shot game scenarios, there 
is often at least the potential for repetition underlying the interaction.  For instance, a 
vendor may take responsibility for faulty merchandise if only to preserve the faint 
possibility of keeping a future customer.  The dynamic of repeated dealings, or the 
potential for repeated interaction, will tend to produce cooperation strategies between 
parties.  These may take many forms, and game theorists have exhibited no lack of 
creativity in conceiving of various strategies.  Among them, the aforementioned tit-for-tat 
strategy (hereafter called TFT) is perhaps the most well known.
204
  TFT is predicated 
upon repeated interaction.
205
  As Ridley observes, ―The principal condition required for 
tit-for-tat to work is a stable repetitive relationship.  The more casual and opportunistic 
the encounters between a pair of individuals, the less likely it is that tit-for-tat will 
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succeed in building cooperation.‖206  Axelrod and Hamilton concluded that so long as 
players have a ―sufficiently large probability‖ of meeting again, TFT can succeed.207  A 
broader conception of the dynamic that underpins TFT is to term such strategies 
(including those that may not technically be TFT) as ―conditionally cooperative.‖208 
 
The often-touted advantage of TFT is that it allows parties to penalize their partners while 
still leaving the door open to continued cooperation.
209
  Certain elements of contracts are 
designed to achieve this very objective.  For example, penalties stipulated in liquidated-
damages clauses may be written into long-term contracts so as to provide a mechanism to 
compensate injured parties for specific breaches, and redirect non-complying parties back 
into compliance, while still preserving the agreement.
210
  The right to affirm a contract in 
the face of a repudiatory breach otherwise allowing for discharge from the contract is 
another such mechanism.
211
  Among other advantages to this, a party can avoid the 
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transaction costs involved in finding a new commercial partner.  This could be 
understood as a ―tit-for-tat with forgiveness‖ strategy as it is termed in game theory.212  
 
Still, there are other elements of commercial law that allow individuals to employ harsher 
retaliatory strategies, such as grimtrigger or permanent retaliation, where a party will 
immediately terminate all future cooperation with a party upon the first sign of trouble.
213
   
Certainly this is the case with commercial interaction where parties do not engage in 
future commercial dealings with individuals who did not honor agreements giving rise to 
repudiatory breaches.  Losing a client is precisely the commercial expression of a 
grimtrigger strategy.  Grimtrigger is typically seen as an inferior strategy;
214
 however, the 
availability of competitors can make this strategy viable in a commercial setting—we 
could rename grimtrigger the ―I‘ll take my business elsewhere‖ strategy.215  Benson, 
indeed, contends that competition can be understood as a ―low-cost option to retribution 
or tit-for-tat sanctions.‖216  
 
The point to be understood here is that commercial interactions can be distinguished from 
non-commercial interactions in that they set out, and more clearly demarcate, a definite 
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cycle of interaction.  A contract can thus be understood as the creation of an iterated 
game.  This sequence of games assists in the spontaneous development of voluntary 
cooperation strategies, thus getting around the need for third party enforcement.  Non-
commercial interactions, on the contrary, are typically one-shot games, if they can be 
defined as games at all.   
 
In sum, when we speak here of high engagement we mean the extent to which individuals 
are involved with the relevant law—that they are engaged with it.  This has two 
components, the first being integrally related to the second. 
 
The first is the simple but profoundly important fact that in commercial interaction parties 
are engaged in the activity more; they simply do it more.  They actively seek out 
interactions, repeat them more frequently (often with the same partners), and, for the 
most part, labor to expand their scope.  This can be understood as repetition. 
The second point is intertwined with the fundamental nature of commerce, and one that 
greatly impacts on the first point.  Commercial interaction creates clear cycles of 
engagement.  It is the act of actively doing something.  Unlike any other form of law, the 
interaction is one that involves the creation of positive duties towards other individuals 
that call for the active and purposive attempt to meet these duties.  Because of this, 
people are drawn into situations where they are highly engaged in the interaction.  A 
commercial interaction represents a clearly delineated cycle of engagement—a ―game.‖ 
Much more so than other areas of law, commercial law is unique because people owe 
each other explicit duties, and the interactions it governs may be repeated with profound 
repetition, constantly running through delineated cycles of interaction.  Continuously 
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repeating these games breeds cooperation—a certain compliance with the norms that 
emerge even when it is not in a party‘s immediate self-interest to do so.  Repeated 
interaction offers a solution to social dilemma problems.
217
  This is made possible by the 
fact that in commercial intercourse there is a well-defined sequence of interaction that 
may be repeated, and it is one that is actively performed.  It is essentially an iterated 
game. 
 
From this whirling pool of association, legal norms can emerge, gain momentum with 
each act of observance, and strengthen over time.  There is no need for coercion; high 
engagement and an underlying recognition of reciprocity can, on their own, foster 
compliance.  Towards this end, high engagement is critically important.   
 
3. High Engagement and Opinio juris sive necessitatis. 
In the absence of enforcement, reciprocity and a high level of engagement are often 
enough to foster the emergence of what can be understood as legal norms.  If not for the 
sheer frequency of interaction and thus exposure to these rules, behavioral conventions 
could not emerge without resort to the edicts of some central authority.
218
  Time is often 
cited as playing a key role in the emergence of international customary law (along with 
universality).
219
  For instance ―French jurisprudence has traditionally required the passage 
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of forty years for the emergence of an international custom, while German doctrine 
generally requires thirty years.‖220  However, as discussed earlier, it is in fact more 
accurate to speak of repeating cycles of engagement in which parties rely on these 
norms—time is but a yardstick with which to gauge how many cycles of interaction have 
occurred.
221
  In that high engagement creates cycles of interaction, it plays a crucial 
function in allowing business practices to ripen into legal norms.  Because networks of 
commercial trade are coursing with a ceaseless flow of countless interactions repetitively 
occurring, a well-defined parameter of conduct can evolve—decentralized order can 
arise.  It is, as Cooter says, ―a social network whose members develop relationships with 
each other through repeated interactions.‖222  From this stream of interactions the 
formative element in customary law identified by the phrase opinio juris sive necessitates 
emerges; that is, the widespread conviction that the practice represents a kind of binding 
norm.
223
  
 
The perception of the norm‘s obligatory nature is crucial in non-enforcement systems 
(and perhaps in all systems of regulation
224
) because it is here that we find the basic 
foundations upon which a system of spontaneous compliance evolves.  Through repeated 
                                                 
220
 Id.   
221
 Similarly, Akehurst points out ―time and repetition are often two sides of the same coin.‖ Michael 
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 1, 12 n.1 (R.Y. Jennings & 
Ian Brownlie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1974-1975); see also MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS WITH 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 24-25 (1985) 
(―active and consistent practice of a comparatively large, ‗representative‘ group of States may harden into 
customary rule [of international law] after a comparatively short period of time‖). 
222
 Cooter, supra note 6, at 216.   
223
 Literally: ―opinion of law but of necessity.‖ Opinio juris sive necessitatis or opinio juris is the 
―widespread belief in the desirability of the norm and the general conviction that the practice represents an 
essential norm of social conduct.‖ Parisi, supra note 180, at 6.  In international law it is the idea that a 
―practice be accepted as law or followed from a sense of obligation.‖ ANDREW T. GUZMÁN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 185 (2008).   
224
 In fact, the functioning of all law is very much predicated upon the norm that legislated law should be 
respected.  In this sense, that individuals obey the law in the first place is driven largely by internalized 
social norms. 
  61 
exposure to a particular rule that confers a reciprocal advantage, participants begin to 
―internalize‖ the norm.225  Fon and Parisi note, ―internalization of [a] norm is a source of 
spontaneous compliance . . . individuals internalize obligations when they disapprove and 
sanction other individuals‘ deviation from the rule, or when they directly lose utility 
when the norm is violated.‖226  The lack of coherent rules undermines the ability of a 
trading community to develop, with the direct consequence that the flow of commerce is 
impeded and participants do lose utility.
227
  In this way, the process of internalization is 
kick-started.  Indeed, ―once there is a general consensus that members of a group ought to 
conform to a given rule of conduct, a legal custom can be said to have emerged when 
some level of spontaneous compliance with the rule is obtained.‖228  
 
Looking at some aspects of business usages, one might hesitate to call these rules law 
with a capital ―L.‖ Nevertheless, these rules are precisely that; they are the nascent 
emergence of norms yet hardened into codified law but every bit as binding upon those 
who voluntarily participate in the affected system.  They are examples of horizontal law, 
as Fuller would call it.
229
  It is only within a system that exhibits such a level of high 
engagement in terms of sheer repetition and discrete cycles of interaction that this form of 
customary law can evolve so vividly.  Without the energizing effect of high engagement 
in the form of repeated exposure and involved participation in these norms, such 
conventions would not have the fertile soil in which to firmly take root.  Thus, 
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engagement is absolutely crucial.  On a very frequent basis, communities of merchants 
and traders are involved in a highly specialized set of relationships as they aggressively 
pursue trade with one another.  The simple fact that they are so involved fosters a clear 
recognition of rules as these parties must frequently employ specific sets of conventions 
to govern their business dealings.  It is not necessary that any one authority formulate 
these rules; the community itself, through the generative process of repeated interaction, 
can produce clear legal norms.  High engagement and reciprocity work in tandem to 
produce identifiable norms and the subsequent adherence to them. 
 
A short review of what was presented up to here might be of some use.  First discussed 
was the idea that systems of commercial law may evolve spontaneously in response to 
market forces, and that such systems may function in the absence of a central authority.  
In lieu of external coercion, the incentive of reciprocal gain implicit in commerce and the 
potential loss of it encourage compliance.  Thus, reciprocity is of paramount importance 
to systems where there is no overarching authority standing by to enforce the rules of the 
game.  Indeed, the players themselves create and acquiesce to the rules, precisely because 
they derive some comparative advantage in continuing to play the game.  To this end, 
what I have termed ―high engagement‖ is absolutely critical in the development of such 
systems of law.  This element of engagement—which is divided into that of repetition 
and the creation of discrete cycles of interaction (game creation)—is critical because it 
has important implications regarding: first, commercial law‘s ability to spontaneously 
forge new legal norms, and second, participants‘ subsequent compliance with those 
norms.   
 
  63 
Left yet to explore in a systematic fashion is how exactly high engagement induces the 
evolution of substantive norms.  The remainder of this paper will discuss how exactly 
high engagement induces the evolution of norms in the absence of a legislative authority.   
 
B. High Engagement: Natural Selection, Norm Creation, and Diffusion 
If a central legislating authority is removed from the equation, the question invariably 
arises: how can legal norms still evolve? To rephrase the question: without a ―lawmaker‖ 
how is law made? As we will see, the element of high engagement here is key.  
According to the perspective most associated with Thomas Hobbes, human society 
requires a coercive authority to enforce systems of cooperation; without the machinery of 
the state, the argument goes, the perennial temptation to free-ride will undermine such a 
system.
230
  Indeed, the work of the new norms scholars of the ―New Chicago School‖ 
reflects the same sentiment in their call for ―governmental intervention to manipulate the 
norm-making process.‖231  However, the stance of Libertarian theorists such as Hayek 
and Benson offers up an alternative explanation of how norms may emerge.   
 
They argue that rules of governance may evolve as the unintended outcome of individuals 
separately pursuing their interests—the same as markets do.232  While there is no central 
authority to create law, the participants themselves, through their very participation, 
generate the relevant legal norms.  Rules evolve spontaneously from the vast flow of 
voluntary interaction, as ―individuals discover that the actions they are intended to 
coordinate are performed more effectively under one system or process than under 
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another.‖233  Through a slow progression of trial and error, duplication and emulation, 
successful rules are modified and employed again in subsequent interactions.  Over time, 
better rules tend to replace less effective ones.  Thus, through a winnowing process, rules 
and institutions are ―naturally selected for‖ and proliferate in use precisely because they 
prove themselves to be the most efficient.
234
  This process is in essence, ―a legal version 
of the Darwinian paradigm.‖235    
 
In this way then, rules evolve slowly over time, emerging incrementally from countless 
repeated interactions.  And it is here that the element of high engagement is so important.  
As has been discussed, commercial law demonstrates a markedly higher degree of 
repeated cycles of interaction.  Without this constant flow of repeated dealings, norms 
could not emerge in this manner.  To this end, game creation and repetition is crucial.   
 
1. Not of Human Design: Legal Norms as an Aggregate of Individuals Separately 
Pursuing Their Interests. 
Hayek contends that there exist orderly structures, which are ―the product of the action of 
many men but are not the result of human design.‖236  This oft-referenced quote by 
Hayek sums up the crux of the position quite nicely.  Efficient systems of order can 
evolve incrementally from a steady flow of countless small occurrences, each one not 
necessarily meant to achieve the final product.  The process is ―independent of any 
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common purpose, which the individual need not even know.‖237  It is possible for 
commercial rules to evolve in such a manner.
238
  
 
In each occurrence, the actors are driven merely by the pursuit of their own interests, that 
is, the acquisition of reciprocal benefit.  The rules that are formulated are created only to 
meet the immediate ends of the specific interaction in which they are involved; but from 
this a greater system of rules will evolve.  It is, in this way, very much like the principle 
that drives the exchange process: ―the order of the market rests not on a common purpose 
but on reciprocity; that is, on the reconciliation of different purposes for the mutual 
benefit of the participants.‖239  Here again it is clear how commercial law is analogous to 
―spontaneous market equilibria,‖240 evolving in relation to commercial forces.  
Coordinated in this fashion by the guiding principle of reciprocal benefit, there emerges a 
tendency towards an overall equilibrium regarding the actions of individuals.
241
  
However, the greater system of legal norms is not the product of any grand design as 
would be the case (at least in theory) with government codification; it is rather the 
outcome of countless tiny interactions—a slow trickle-like build up of norms from the 
unintended outcome of individuals separately pursuing their interests. 
 
This is particularly true in the case of commercial intercourse; each isolated interaction, 
each exchange guided by the pursuit of individual gain contributes to the blind 
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articulation of an overall coherent body of rules.  As is noted by Parisi, this formulation 
―proceeds through a purely inductive accounting of subjective preferences.  Through his 
own action, each individual contributes to the creation of law.  The emerging rule thus 
embodies the aggregate effects of independent choices by various individuals that 
participate in its formation.‖242  
 
2. Making Law Through Contract: Norm Tweaking. 
Parisi is here referring to all forms of customary law.  However, this process is especially 
salient in commerce.  Why? Commercial interaction is so much more fertile soil for this 
process primarily because the parties themselves are in a position to tweak the law.  The 
nature of contract is one that allows for the formulation of new terms and conditions that 
will, with repeated use, mature into legal norms.  As Parisi notes, ―[t]his . . . process 
allows individuals to reveal their preferences through their own action, without the 
interface of third-party decision makers.‖243  From this succession of interactions, the law 
is incrementally adjusted through a process of ―norm tweaking.‖ 
 
This is nowhere more true than in the realm of contract, where parties can actually draw 
up the rules that will govern their interactions.  Fuller actually defined contract law as an 
explicit form of law fashioned through an explicit process of bargaining.
244
  Indeed, ―The 
parties who negotiate such law are a kind of miniature legislature, and their law a 
miniature statute.‖245  Through the synergetic process of contract, participants cast their 
vote on what they have concluded is the most efficient rule regarding their specific 
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situation.  A continual ―referendum‖ on rules is taking place with each interaction.  This 
is profoundly different from other forms of law derived solely from legislation or even 
stare decisis.  In such cases, there is no means for participants to directly and plainly 
signal perceived shortcomings in the law; there is no opportunity to tweak and refine the 
law in such a direct fashion.
246
  Through contract, commercial law gives voice to the 
actual participants.  The merchants themselves ―decide with whom they wish to contract 
and upon what terms; they determine the limits of their own requirements; and they 
establish the parameters of their obligations.‖247  Thus a situation emerges in which the 
law may be continually refined.  As Benson explains, 
The commercial sector continues to develop an expanding base of 
customary law.  Order clearly arises from contractual agreements, for 
instance.  Thus, contracts negotiated and voluntarily entered into by 
private individuals provide one form of privately created law. . . . [I]f a 
contract develops an effective new business practice in the face of a new 
situation, it is likely to add to customary law.  Since commerce operates in 
a dynamic continually changing environment, new contractual 
arrangements are always being mediated—new law is being created.248 
 
This body of law ―grows, it does not change in the sense that an old law is suddenly 
overturned and replaced by a new law.  That growth tends to be gradual but fairly 
continuous, through spontaneous collaboration.‖249  Because it allows its consumers to 
directly shape its constitution, commercial law is able to evolve in the unique fashion 
described by Benson.   
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3. Norms Are Reviewed in Situations of Success as Well as Failure. 
It is important to note how much this differs from other forms of law.  In non-commercial 
forms of law, the efficacy of the law is examined only in cases where the law has 
essentially failed, and as a consequence, has given rise to litigation.
250
  Litigation alone 
(and actual legislation) provides the only occasion for possible amendments to the law.  
Rubin and Priest point out that legal rules will only be challenged in court if they prove to 
be inefficient.
251
  Leoni argues that ―individuals make the law, insofar as they make 
successful claims.‖252  Such is the case with most forms of law.  Review is limited to 
situations of actual litigation, when official attention is drawn to the inadequacy of the 
law highlighted by its own failure.   
 
This is not so with commercial law.  Commercial law is subject to immediate review in 
each and every interaction regardless, precisely because the participants themselves are 
actively engaged in ―tuning‖ the law.  Thus, the efficiency of a rule is not only evaluated 
in cases where it has failed (this can be in the case of formal litigation or simply by the 
parties themselves if no litigation is initiated), but equally in cases where it has 
succeeded.  Moreover, the efficiency of a commercial rule is scrutinized in situations 
where, in place of outright failure, the law merely portrays a slight degree of inefficiency.  
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Insofar as non-commercial law goes, situations where the law does not fail to the point of 
giving rise to actual litigation, but nevertheless lacks the comparable efficiency of 
alternative rules, the law in question will not have the occasion to be modified.  This is 
the inherent advantage of decentralized rule making: it can be continually tweaked 
because those who directly engage in the regulated activity are in a position to fine-tune 
the rules, either through direct modification or through the selection of alternative rules to 
govern their future dealings.
253
  Indeed, Fuller among others, recognized this advantage in 
customary law, citing how spontaneously evolved rules emerge through ―dispute 
arbitration and adjudication combined with the spread of superior ways of doing things 
through competition and imitation.‖254   
 
Contract law is unique in that it allows for a more active role in its actual formulation.  
The parties of the contract are their own ―miniature legislature,‖ judging the efficiency of 
their contractual arrangement through the very commercial interaction they undertake.  
The rules that govern their dealings are constantly being evaluated in terms of their 
ability to achieve varying levels of efficiency.  In this way, traces of inefficiency can be 
addressed; in subsequent dealings rules that prove even slightly impractical can be 
jettisoned and more efficient rules may be adopted in their place.  With each new 
interaction, players can engage in a process of ―norm tweaking.‖ This has the ultimate 
effect of making commercial law far more amenable to a kind of incremental evolution 
that incorporates a natural selection-like process. 
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4. Law Evolves Towards Efficiency. 
This body of law continually evolves through a process of natural selection towards ever-
greater efficiency.
255
  Through their participation, actors refine the rules that oversee their 
commercial arrangements.  Pragmatism and meeting the requirements of the market is the 
guiding spirit of such reform.  Hayek contends that such a process generally produces an 
optimal system of rules, which could not be achieved through any planned scheme.
256
  
Hayek asserts that ―a spontaneous system of rules will be more efficient . . . precisely 
because it has survived an evolutionary process: a process in which not reason but 
natural selection determines which rules and institutions are appropriate.‖257  This is a 
central argument of Hayek‘s: order that evolves spontaneously from a decentralized 
process can achieve a greater degree of efficiency.
258
  As discussed earlier, this notion 
arguably lies embedded within the theoretical underpinnings of the common law.
259
  As 
Ellickson notes, social norms that evolve ―through natural selection tend to be wiser than 
the ratiocinated policies of the most brilliant policy makers.‖260  
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The decentralized process of norm formation in commercial systems is comparable to any 
other decentralized market process.
261
  Thus, just as decentralized market processes have 
―a comparative advantage over centralized allocation mechanisms in the creation of 
efficient equilibria,‖262 so too does a decentralized process of norm formation arising in 
response to the same commercial forces that drive the market.  Such a process is 
analogous to a decentralized decision making process, possessing a certain advantage 
over centralized processes in generating efficient rules.
263
  Thus, in this manner, a process 
of natural selection refines the rules of commerce towards greater and greater efficiency. 
 
The basic nature of commerce is very receptive to an evolution of this sort.  The market 
itself provides an exceptionally accurate mechanism with which to gauge the 
‗effectiveness‘ of these rules.264 Commercial efficiency is the sole measure of any rule.  
Thus, rules that do not prove to the most effective are quickly discarded and replaced by 
more efficient ones.
265
  The element of competition, implicit in commercial enterprise, 
ensures this.  In order to remain competitive, those engaged in commerce must adopt 
more efficient rules to oversee their interactions.  To not do so, would imperil their 
competitive position, and ultimately their commercial survival.  Thus, it is not even really 
a question of choice; driven by competition, actors are often forced to implement 
commercial laws that have proven most functionally efficient.  As with natural selection 
in the biological world, those who do not remain competitive simply do not survive.  
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Those who develop better rules and thus reinforce their capacity to successfully trade are 
able to flourish, and with them, the rules they choose to institute.  In this sense, 
competition breeds efficiency.  Non-commercial law is not predicated upon competition.  
As a result, there is no comparable imperative to improve upon less then optimally 
efficient norms.  Evolutionary traps may emerge.
266
  A coercive authority is thus needed 
to institute and enforce changes in law, and knock it back on a more collectively 
beneficial track.  In contrast, commerce, with its unforgiving bottom line and its twin 
gods of profit and loss, confers survival only to the fittest. 
 
What is true for individual actors within commerce is also true for entire systems of 
commercial law.  New rules and institutions that prove more efficient will be adopted by 
groups of actors so long as transaction costs do not thwart this process.
267
  As a result, 
―more effective rules and institutional arrangements tend to replace less effective ones as 
individuals observe, learn, imitate, and secede in order to migrate when superior 
competitive alternatives are available.‖268  Indeed, as we have seen, the primary catalyst 
for the emergence of the Medieval Law Merchant was in fact that it was a more 
commercially efficient system of law.
269
  In a modern context, jurisdictional ―shopping‖ 
embodies this phenomenon.  Parties will tend to choose the jurisdiction that proves least 
disruptive to their commercial interests.
270
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5. Each Repeated Interaction Is a Test-Run. 
What is true for the theory of natural selection in the realm of biology is also true for this 
evolutionary process of ―norm tweaking.‖ For such a complex system to emerge in this 
incremental fashion, it is paramount that we are dealing with a vast multitude of 
interactions.  Each successive interaction builds on the one before it.  It is a process of 
repeated refinement and improvement.  To this end, high engagement plays a decisive 
role.  The higher the level of engagement, the more easily norms may evolve in this 
fashion.   
 
Central to this evolutionary process is the ability for rules to be repeatedly evaluated and 
then modified.  Commerce is precisely such a situation.  Each commercial interaction 
represents a discrete test of the efficiency of a given rule.  The interaction itself is an ideal 
platform from which to evaluate the worth of a particular rule; the relative success or 
failure of the commercial interaction itself serves as a precise measurement of the rule‘s 
efficiency.
271
  Each commercial dealing then is, in a sense, a test run of the rule‘s 
effectiveness performed by the parties in the best position to most accurately appraise the 
practical impact of the rule upon the interaction.  Through subsequent contract formation, 
this evaluation can immediately translate into a change in the rules.
272
  Thus, the process 
of constant and repeated ―norm tweaking‖ is instrumental in this evolution.  And towards 
this end, repeating these appraisals in the form of frequent commercial dealings is 
essential—it stands to reason that the more it is repeated, the more powerfully this 
process can occur.
273
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Because commerce entails a higher level of engagement in which players repeat 
interactions, there is a constant flow of independent ―test-runs.‖ These ―test-runs‖ serve 
an important function in the emergence of norms; a single interaction represents a 
complete test cycle through which a given rule can be evaluated.  It is one small juncture 
in a long sequence of evolution comprising a succession of minute interactions.  
Completing these cycles is crucial to an evolutionary process.  Cycles of interaction allow 
a rule to be tested, providing incremental feedback at discrete stages along the way.  This 
is not so with other forms of law where the element of high engagement is absent.  As 
non-commercial forms of law generally do not consist of a concrete series of actions, no 
definite cycle of interaction is formed.  Further, these interactions are not repeated with 
the same frequency.   
 
As in evolutionary biology, where more efficient traits become more common in 
successive generations of a population as each organism reproduces, so too in the process 
of legal natural selection efficient rules thrive as subsequent interactions employ the 
rule.
274
  The repetition of a single cycle of interaction is comparable to an organism 
reproducing in the field of biology.  Indeed, as we discussed, successful commercial 
ventures will often lead to a repetition of the same interaction.  This is in fact often the 
overarching objective to the interaction—reproducing it.  More efficient rules help ensure 
the success of an interaction, which in turn may then be repeated.  Thus high engagement 
produces cycle of interaction that serve as important feedback loops, contributing to this 
legal evolution.   
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6. Norm Diffusion. 
High engagement also has the effect of spreading norms between groups.
275
  Successful 
players will often seek out new partners with which to forge new business relationships, 
in an effort to duplicate their prior successes and expand their pool of wealth.  Thus, as 
within the realm of biology, efficient rules will spread by way of this mixing—something 
akin to the spreading of an advantageous gene pool.
276
  In other forms of law, we do not 
find a comparable fluid mixing of specific, targeted partners.  This has a large part to do 
with the fact that commercial law is, as we have already mentioned, unique in that it 
requires the seeking out of explicit partners with whom to establish a definite 
relationship, and engage in a clear delineated cycle of interaction: business.  Other forms 
of law are not so much to do with the building of partnerships, as they are concerned with 
preventing injurious interactions between individuals in a large group.
277
  Again, here we 
have the idea that commercial law is the active formation of new relationships of 
cooperation between select parties, while non-commercial law involves the regulating of 
the behavior of individuals through injunctions, that is, what not to do.
278
  Thus, the 
former will force a mixing of players by linking together individuals, producing a greater 
diffusion of norms.   
 
While forms of association regulated by non-commercial law are generally static, 
commercial interactions, in contrast, are highly specialized, active, and marked by a 
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tendency to build fresh relationships with new partners.  Although I share a fleeting legal 
relationship with the man I pass on the street in that we both obey the law, mutually 
refraining from inflicting harm on one another (hopefully), we do not construct a 
specialized form of association, and, more importantly, nor do I actively seek out new 
people to pass on the street.  In this sense, these relationships can be understood as 
generally static.  Commerce, in contrast, is a bridge between particular parties within a 
greater community.  Perhaps it could be conceptualized in this manner: while non-
commercial law regulates interactions between individuals in ―a large and at times 
somewhat unclearly defined community,‖279 commercial interaction is in effect the 
constructing of a miniature community within the larger community, one sometimes 
involving only two parties (if this can rightly be called a community).  It constructs a 
clear, dynamic relationship between them.  Thus, this ―bridge‖ created between one set of 
people, can then be extended to another, and so forth.  In each instance, a smaller 
―community‖ is carved out from the greater whole—the result being a greater diffusion of 
norms, as norms are carried from one ―community‖ to the next.   
 
And this applies equally to entire regions; this mixing often reaches across the threshold 
of national and cultural borders, as the long arm of commerce extends to wherever it can 
seize hold of a business opportunity and flourish.  Thus, the nature of commerce, in that it 
constructs new and specialized forms of association between definite parties, in the 
process facilitates a diffusion of proven efficient rules that are instituted to oversee these 
interactions.  To be sure, when it is pronounced within a system, the element of high 
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engagement is instrumental in aiding the evolution of norms through a process of natural 
selection and its subsequent diffusion.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that markets can and do evolve in a spontaneous, decentralized fashion.  
Markets evolve as they do, guided by an invisible hand, an aggregate of countless 
individuals separately pursuing their own interests.  This can, however, hold equally true 
for the law that governs the market.  As we examined in the first half of this paper, the 
same forces that direct economic evolution, namely reciprocal benefit, may also help 
generate legal norms.  Understood in this light, the unique nature of commercial law 
comes into clearer focus.  It emerges from a highly specialized dynamic of human 
relations, with its own set of governing principles.  Most crucial though is the manner of 
interaction implied by commercial association.  At the outset of the discussion I argued 
that the nature of commercial interaction is fundamentally different from other forms of 
human interaction, and that while the significance of this unique manner of interaction, 
which I termed high engagement, has gone largely unappreciated in theories of 
spontaneous law, its role in the ability of commercial law to follow paths of decentralized 
evolution is decisive.   
 
The second half of the paper set out the idea of high engagement.  I argued that it 
comprises two, intertwined components: repetition and the creation of discrete cycles of 
interaction (game creation).  We looked first at repetition, discerning four points that 
induce the emergence of legal norms.  The first is that actors tend to engage in repeated 
interaction with one another.  The second is that the frequency of these interactions can 
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greatly increase.  The third point was that participants in commerce expand their 
associations, actively seeking out opportunities to construct new sets of relations with 
different parties.  The fourth point was that business actors are repeatedly and constantly 
engaged in situations where these norms are of primary importance thus forming the 
guiding constitution of their actions.   
 
While the repetition of commercial interactions induces the emergence of norms, the 
second aspect of high engagement in fact facilitates this tendency by producing clear 
cycles of interaction that then lends itself to repetition.  Five points were explored here.  
The first was that the nature of the interaction itself allows for the possibility of more 
frequent repetition by providing a delineated cycle of interaction that may be run through 
over and over.  The second point was that actors engage in performing something rather 
than refraining from doing something.  That is, commercial relations create positive 
duties to act, producing something tangible that may then be repeated.  Next we looked at 
the idea that parties‘ ability to form contracts tailored to their specific situation allows 
players to construct law.  We then examined how commercial trade is in effect a 
delineated game, allowing parties to repeatedly run through rounds of interaction, which 
assists in the generation of norms.  Finally, we looked at the idea that commercial 
interactions can be conceptualized as repeated games, and the importance of repeated 
interaction in reference to social dilemmas. 
 
These two aspects of high engagement are in fact intimately connected.  The nature of 
commerce creates small ―chunks‖ of interaction, and at the same time, encourages parties 
to run through them again and again.  This plays a decisive role in the spontaneous 
  79 
evolution of legal norms.  Without the ability for commercial actors to run through 
repeated cycles of interaction, it would be difficult for clear normative rules to emerge 
without relying on some legislative authority.   
 
In the final portion of the discussion I examined how the element of high engagement 
allows legal norms to evolve through an evolutionary process reminiscent of natural 
selection.  Six points were made regarding this.  The first was that countless individual 
actors separately pursing their interests in fact allow a greater system of norms to 
incrementally evolve through sheer repetition.  The second point was that the nature of 
contract is one that permits the formulation of new terms that will, through repeated use, 
mature into recognized norms.  I then explored the idea that in each cycle of interaction 
the efficiency of a commercial rule is subject to immediate review.  This applies to 
situations of success as well as failure, or even slight inefficiency.  The fourth point was 
that through repeated and engaged participation, the law evolves towards efficiency.  The 
element of competition implicit in commercial enterprise virtually ensures parties will 
adopt the most efficient rules to oversee their interactions.  Driven by competition, actors 
are forced to adopt norms that have proven most efficient.  I then made the point that 
interactions are instrumental as ―test-runs.‖  Each successive interaction builds on the one 
before it in a process of repeated refinement and improvement.  Here, I emphasized the 
importance of these cycles of interaction as incremental feedback.  The final point made 
was regarding the important role high engagement plays in facilitating the diffusion of 
norms.  Commerce connects and facilitates communication between disparate parties, if 
not directly, then indirectly through the complex web of commercial associations it 
engenders.   
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Commercial society's capacity for self-organization is astonishing.  To be sure, law 
regulating commercial interaction is, more so than any other form of law, uniquely 
positioned to evolve in a decentralized, spontaneous manner.  Other forms of human 
interaction may generate law in this fashion; however, commercial interaction is 
intrinsically inclined to do so.  This is not only due to the reciprocal nature of commercial 
relationships; the engaged nature of commercial interaction plays a vitally important role 
in this process.  Indeed, high engagement engenders naturally generated mechanisms for 
legal recognition, adjudication, and change, thus lessening the need for a centralized 
legislative authority.  In sum, commercial law is unique in that it possesses both 
reciprocity and high engagement.  Ultimately, these twin elements serve as the two wings 
of spontaneous legal ordering—if both are present, decentralized legal development may 
indeed take flight. 
 
